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ABSTRACT 
The increasingly intense competition between commercial and recreational fishermen for access 
to fish stocks has focused attention on the economic implications of fishery allocations. Indeed, 
one can scarcely find a management plan or amendment that does not at least refer to the relative 
food and sport values of fish and to how expenditures by commercial and recreational fishermen 
on equipment and supplies stimulate the economy. However, many of the arguments raised by 
constituents to influence such allocations, while having an seemingly "economics" ring to them, 
are usually incomplete, distorted, and even incorrect. This report offers fishery managers and 
other interested parties a guide to correct notions of economic value and to the appropriate ways 
to characterize, estimate, and compare value. In particular, introductory material from benefit-
cost analysis and input-output analysis is described and illustrated. In the process , several familiar 
specious arguments are exposed . 
Introduction ______________ _ 
Competition between commercial and recreational fisher-
men for fish, although certainly not new, is intensifying 
as a direct result of increased demand for seafood, increased 
participation in marine recreational fishing, and, in many 
cases, reduced stock sizes. Consequently, fishery managers 
throughout the United States and the world are increas-
ingly confronted with allocating fish stocks between com-
mercial and recreational fishermen. For example, the 
federal Regional Fishery Management Councils recently 
allocated redfish in the Gulf of Mexico, coho and chinook 
salmon in the Pacific, and billfish species in the northwest 
Atlantic to these user groups. Allocation of many other 
shared species, such as sharks, is imminent. 
Given the financial stakes in having access to a fish stock, 
it is not surprising that economics receives increased 
attention when fishery allocations are contended. Unfor-
tunately, many contemporary arguments which are ad-
vanced by user groups and related constituencies, while 
having an apparently reasonable "economics" ring to 
them, are usually incomplete, distorted, and even incor-
rect. For example, commercial fishermen sometimes 
characterize sport fishing as the adult-equivalent of play-
something devoid of economic value . This ' 'market value-
argument" is incorrect, however, because it presumes that 
only markets beget economic value. As another example, 
game fish status is often advocated for a fishery resource, 
such as billfish, when revenues from anglers' expenditures 
on fishing supplies are greater than dockside revenue in 
the commercial fishery for the same species. Among the 
mistakes inherent in this " revenues-argument," however, 
is that it contradicts any rational desire of an angler or 
business to minimize the costs of fishing. 
One danger of these and other biased arguments or 
perceptions is that they could undermine management 
which is designed to enhance the economic value that all 
Americans derive from their publicly owned fish stocks . 
Indeed, to optimize the economic value of fish used for food 
and sport is one of the primary objectives of the Magnuson 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act-an objective 
that justifies government management of common prop-
erty fisheries. Yet, management which is based on in-
appropriate (as well as insufficient) economics data and 
analyses will fall well short of this justification, and it could 
be challenged and delayed after receiving required profes-
sional reviews. Even plans actually approved by higher 
authorities, such as the Secretary of Commerce in the case 
of federal fishery management, could later be withdrawn 
or reversed after the appropriate data are collected and 
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analyzed correctly. Clearly , the need to elucidate the eco-
nomics of allocation between commercial and recreational 
fisheri es is present, great , and increasing. 
Every discipline has unique jargon which facilitates com-
munication among its rank and file, but which also con-
fuses and alienates others. Economics, with its sometimes 
bewildering confluence with mathematics and statistics, is 
an extreme example of this problem , especially when ap-
plied to fishery allocations. Thus, economists are obligated 
to make their subject accessible to others if we hope to see 
economic analyses applied correctly. An understanding of 
benefit-cost analysis and input-output analysis is particu-
larly important. Accordingly , this guide was written with 
three purposes in mind: 1) to expose specious economics-
sounding arguments common in the public debate of 
fishery allocation; 2) to offer those with an interest in fishery 
management a foundation of economic concepts, prin-
ciples, and methods which are germ ane to fishery alloca-
tion; and 3) to promote sound economic analyses and com-
parisons of the economic value of commercial and recrea-
tional fisheries. 
T hroughout this guide, bear in mind the distinction 
between the quality of an analysis and its appropriateness. 
The quality of any analysis, such as a stock assessment or 
a benefit-cost analysis, is constrained by available data, 
the state of the art in research methodologies, and, of 
course, manpower and budgets . In contrast, no amount 
of data or no methodology-no matter how accurate or 
eloquent-can shed light on the allocation debate when 
they are inappropriate. Particularly worrisome is the 
misuse of purely financial information, such as expen-
ditu res and revenues, and input-output analysis to assess 
the economic values of commercial and recreational 
fisheries. 
Instead, what is needed is an understanding of how data 
on expenditures and revenues can be correctly used, within 
the context of benefit-cost analysis, to measure the economic 
value of fish in commercial and recreational uses. Accord-
ingly, this guide offers fishery managers, policy makers, 
and others with an interest in fishery management a foun-
dation in the concepts, principles, and methodology of 
benefit-cost analysis . However, this guide was not intended 
to be a handbook or "recipe" for the actual execution of 
benefit- cost analysis by practitioners. Its more modest pur-
pose was to help non-economists, if you will , better under-
stand how to compare the economic value offish allocated 
between commercial and recreational fisheries. 
The Economic Value section and the Benefit-Cost Anal-
ysis section define and illustrate concepts and principles 
which are fundamental to a basic understanding of benefit-
cost analysis. The Economic Value section , which focuses 
on the foundations of economic value, is a springboard for 
the Benefit-Cost Analysis section where the elements of 
benefit-cost analysis, including resource costs, net national 
benefits, and efficiency, are presented. In the Input-Output 
Analysis section, input-output analysis, which widely serves 
as a model of interactions within an economy (one of 
several methodologies generally referred to as economic im-
pact analysis), is described and critiqued within the con-
text of fishery valuation . Im portant differences between 
benefit-cost analysis and input-ou tput analysis are under-
scored in the Comparison of Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) 
and Input-Output Analysis (l OA) section. The glossary 
in Appendix A serves as a reference for all these sections . 
An example is possibly the best way to illustrate how 
to compare the commercial and recreational values of fi sh 
and to reinforce the characteristics of an efficient alloca-
tion of total allowable catch between fisheries. Accordingly, 
this guide culminates in the Efficient Allocation section with 
an exercise that highlights the concepts and principles 
presented previously. Finally, the Summary and Conclu-
sions section briefly summarizes and concludes the guide . 
Although written at an introductory level, the reader will 
be challenged by a host of unfamiliar terms that probably 
cannot be assimilated casually in one sitting. Indeed, an 
irony about learning a new subject-any subject-is that 
introductory material always seems the hardest to grasp 
simply because it is new and, at times, because preconcep-
tions must be overcome. Consequently, a modest commit-
ment of time and an open m ind is requested . For more 
information on the subject, readers might consult more 
general introductions to fishery economics that were pre-
pared by McConnell and Norton (1976), Rothschild et al. 
(1977), Sutinen (1980) , and Talhelm (1987) . 
This guide was also written with economists in mind, 
however, as well as others who might want more general 
information. When I sacrificed precision in favor of a 
simple straight forward presentation of a concept or prin-
ciple, I tried to make amends in a footnote. In addition, 
more extensive treatment of technical material was rele-
gated to two appendices. Appendix B covers the elements 
of input-output analysis in considerable detail , and valua-
tion of a fishery resource in a multimarket framework is 
presented in Appendix C. Nevertheless , readers who are 
interested only in acquiring a gut feeling for the issues can 
stick to the main text. 
Finally, although allocation between commercial and 
recreational fisheries was the primary focus of this guide, 
the information presented here applies equally well to 
economic analyses of other types of allocation decisions 
involving fisheries, including gear conflicts and conflicts 
between fishing (commercial and/or recreational) and 
aquaculture, dredging, waste disposal, oil extraction, ship-
ping, and wetland destruction. 
Economic Value ____________ _ 
Benefit-cost analysis cannot be understood without a solid 
foundation in concepts of economic value . Accordingly, 
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this section begins by defining economic value in terms of 
what seafood consumers and anglers are willing to spend 
on seafood and sport-caught fish. Next, the relationship 
between demand and economic value is illustrated. Subse-
quently, the importance of consumer surplus-the net 
worth of fish to consumers after expenditures are subtracted 
from total economic value-is emphasized given its impor-
tance in benefit-cost analysis. This section ends with a sum-
mary of the salient points. 
What Is Economic Value and How Is It Measured? 
This section is devoted to defining economic value for use 
in benefit-cost analysis and to briefly indicating how it is 
measured. It will be shown that economic value is derived 
ultimately from the tastes and preferences of consumers, 
where "consumers" is defined broadly to include those who 
eat fish and all anglers (regardless of whether their catch 
is eaten).! In fact, the total economic value of fish is 
'To keep things focused on the current allocation issues, other categories 
of economic value related to nonconsumptive use (e .g., watching salmon 
and herring runs), indirect use (e .g., watching shows about sport fishing) , 
B 
Figure 1 
Economic value is determined by the maximum 
amount that consumers are willing to pay for fish. The 
increments of value are traced by a demand curve. 
defined and measured in terms of what someone is willing 
to pay for fish-either for food or for sport-in lieu of 
spending the same amount of money on other goods and 
services which satisfy personal needs and wants . 
A simple yet powerful proposition is that the most that 
a consumer is willing to spend on fish increases with each 
additional fish but at a decreasing rate (assuming, of 
course, that factors which influence consumption, such as 
income and preferences for seafood or recreational fishing, 
remain unchanged). That is, during a specified period of 
time, such as one week, each additional fish cooked for 
dinner or each additional fish caught on a fishing trip 
benefits the consumer, but the additional satisfaction 
derived from each additional fish gets smaller and smaller. 
Figure lA illustrates a hypothetical case in which, for ex-
ample, the second flounder cooked for dinner is not as satis-
fying as the first flounder. Alternatively, if this plot were 
for recreational fishing it would indicate that catching the 
second flounder is not as enjoyable as catching the first fish. 
preservation value (preserving fish for their own good) , and bequest value 
(preserving fish for use by future generations) are omitted. See Randall 
(1987) for a discussion of these benefit categories. 
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It follows, then, that the consumer is willing to pay for the 
second fish, but the maximum amount is less than that for 
the first fish. Similarly, the most that the consumer is will-
ing to pay for the third fish is positive but less than that 
for the second fish, and so on. Figure 1A illustrates these 
properties of preferences with a curve that increases grad-
ually from zero as the total number of fish and, therdore, 
total maximum willingness-to-pay increase. 
The relationship depicted in Figure 1A between con-
sumption of fish and the maximum that a consumer is will-
ing to pay for fish is simple, but it has several very impor-
tant implications for economic valuation. Foremost, total 
economic value is defined and measured by the maximum that a con-
sumer is willing to pay jor the good or service (in our case, fish). 
Accordingly, economic value has monetary units2 
Second, because the total value curve in Figure 1A 
answers questions such as, "What is the total economic 
value of all three flounder?," then the demand curve in 
Figure 1B answers related questions such as, "What is the 
economic value of the third flounder?" In other words, a 
consumer's demand curve traces the most that hel3he is 
willing to pay for each additional fish. Therefore , the entire 
area under a demand curve is equivalent to total economic 
value. In this exercise, the total economic value of th,~ first 
three flounder is $36 .67 from Figure lA, or, equivalently , 
$20 + $10 + $6.67 = $36.67 from Figure lB. 
Notice that in every day language "demand" refers to 
frequency of use, such as the quantity of fish consumed, 
the number of consumers or anglers, and the number of 
fishing trips. In economics, however, demand is a behav-
ioral relationship which portrays how seafood consumers 
and anglers alter the quantity of fish used for food and sport 
in response to changes in costs and a number of other fac-
tors which affect willingness-to-pay, such as income, catch 
rate, the costs of other goods and services which are 
substitutes for fish, and the amount of leisure time ([or 
anglers). For example, under normal circumstances an in-
crease in income would increase a consumer's ability, and, 
therefore, willingness to pay for fish. With regard to Figure 
1, an increase in the consumer's income would increase, 
or "lift" maximum willingness-to-pay in Figure lA, caus-
ing the demand curve in Figure 1B to shift right. As 
another example, if the cost of a substitute for flounder 
increased-perhaps the price of cod fillets or the costs o[ 
fishing for, say, bluefish-the consumer 's demand for 
flounder would increase because compared to the substi-
tute, flounder becomes relatively less expensive. 
Perhaps the most important point implied by Figure 1 
is that economic value and demand exist even when marke:s and 
2Economic value can also be measured in terms of willingness-to-accept-
compensation. See, for example , Just et aI. 's (1982) discussion of Hick-
sian surplus concepts. Also, Bockstael and Strand (1985) showed that 
economic values can be measured in terms of time when a time con-
straint is included in the utility maximization problem. 
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Demand captures consumer surplus and determines total con-
sumer expenditures. 
prices are nonexistent. Markets and prices actually emerge 
[rom the collective behavior of consumers and businesses 
when property rights are well-defined , exclusive , and en-
forced. When available, prices help to reveal the maximum 
that consumers are willing to pay for fish or fishing. How-
ever, prices do not, as is commonly thought, create demand 
or economic value . Indeed, the opposite is true-demand, 
or willingness-to-pay, is necessary for markets and prices 
to emerge . Accordingly , anglers derive economic value 
from resources such as fish stocks even when access to 
beaches, piers , and boat launches is not rationed by 
m arkets. 
Finally, total economic value is composed of two parts 
as shown in Figure 2. The rectangle that is delineated from 
above by the price line is total consumer expenditures. For 
seafood consumers, total expenditures by the consumer is 
money spent on seafood in retail markets. For anglers, total 
consumer expenditures are expenses for gasoline, bait, 
tackle, boats, charter/party boat fishing, and other fishing 
supplies that the angler uses to catch fish. 
In contrast, the shaded area above the expenditures 
triangle is the net economic value of fish to the consumer. 
This component of total economic value is called consumer 
surplus. Consumer surplus amounts to the value enjoyed by a con-
sumer in excess oj what was sacrificed to buy or catch jish. 
The concept of consumer surplus often invites skepticism 
in fishery managers and policy makers because it is not 
tangible in the sense that expenditures or revenues involve 
the exchange of money. Nevertheless, consumer surplusjollows 
logically jrom the reasonable properties oj consumer preferences 
depicted in Figure 1 and jrom the corollary that economic value can 
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Change in consumer surplus due to (A ) a change in the price of 
seafood and (B) a change in catch rate. 
be measured in terms of willingness-to-pay because people allocate 
their income among things that satisfy their personal needs and wants. 
As further evidence in defense of consumer surplus, con-
sider the value that a seafood consumer would receive if 
given flou nder fillets for free, or the value that an angler 
would receive if invited to fish for free on a charter boat. 
Although there is no financial cost to these consumers, they 
certainly would value these gifts. Alternatively, think of 
consumer surplus as additional money a consumer would 
spend on fish but which is not required at current market 
prices or costs of fishing, and, instead, can be spent on 
other goods and services that are valued. Similarly, a price 
reduction on, say, flounder fillets or charter boat fishing 
leaves consumers with "extra" money that can be spent 
on more fish or other goods and services that provide 
additional value. 
Consumer surplus is a theoretically sound and real 
category of economic value-it is not arbitrary and can-
not be assumed away. Nor can its role in benefit-cost 
analysis be overemphasized. Consumer surplus and, for now, 
an analogous value category for producers that is somewhat related 
to profit, are the two value categories covered by the "benefit" side 
of benefit-cost analysis. Similar to profit , consumer surplus 
is a benefit in excess of costs . 
By way of review , economic value is defined and mea-
sured by the m aximum that consumers a re willing to pay 
for fish or any good or service, including other natural 
resources and environmental services and amenities. Total 
economic value can be decomposed into expenditures, or 
what consumers must give up to obtain fish , and consumer 
surplus. C onsumer surplus is an essential component of 
the value that consumers receive from their publicly owned 
fish resources. 
Measur ing Economic Value 
A few th ings should be said about how to measure con-
sumer surplus, including economic value derived from the 
natural environment such as fish stocks. First , the availabil-
ity of price and quantity data from m arkets facilitates the 
estimation of demand curves and , therefore, the estimation 
of economic value. Usually, aggregate demand curves are 
estimated (in effect, the summation of all individual con-
sumer demand curves), although individual demand curves 
can sometimes be identified . When faced with a market 
price, consumers decide, for example, how much fresh fish 
to buy at a market or how often to order seafood at a 
restaurant. Statistical methods such as regression analysis 
can then be used to estimate dem and equations based on 
market data on quantities of fish sold at various prices and 
on data on income, the prices of substitutes, and other fac-
tors which affect willingness-to-pay. For example, the de-
mand model for flounder that is illustrated in Figure 3A 
was adapted from Cheng and Capps's (1 987) report (H -t. 
Cheng and O. CappsJr, Agriculture Experiment Station , 
Univ. Georgia, Athens , GA, unpub!. manuscr., " Demand 
analysis of fresh frozen finfish and shellfish in the United 
States" 1987) on household demand for fmfish and shell-
fish. At $3 per pound, quantity-demanded by the average 
household which consumes seafood is between five and six 
pounds annually, total expenditures are approximately 
$17.75, consumer surplus is $12.00, and, therefore, total 
economic value is $29.75. If the price increases to, say, 
$3 .50 because of an allocation rule which, in effect, de-
creases the amount of flounder that can be sold commer-
cially (or, perhaps because of over-fishing or poor recruit-
ment which reduces stock size), then consumer surplus for 
the average household decreases by $2.77. Alternatively, 
a management rule (or increase in stock size) which 
ultimately increases the amount of flounder sold commer-
cially and leads to, say, a fifty cent reduction in retail price 
would increase consumer surplus by $3 .14.3 (Notice that 
' Cheng and Capps (1987) actually report Engle models. Their expenditure 
model for flounder was converted to a demand model by dividing both 
sides by price (dividing the endogenous variable, expenditures, by prices 
yields quantity). 
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although the change in price was fifty cents in both cases, 
the increase in consumer surplus from the price reduction 
is greater than the loss of consumer surplus becaus( of the 
inverse relationship between quantity-demanded and in-
crements in maximum willing-ness-to-pay.) 
In contrast to markets for seafood, legions of marine 
anglers actually "produce" their own fish for sport and 
food . Often their "production" involves renting charter 
fishing services (including party boats and rentals from 
marinas), but more frequently the goods and services 
used to catch fish are purchased directly by the anglers. 
Nevertheless, angler behavior reveals the economic value 
derived from fish. For example, travel costs such as gaso-
line and the costs of bait and fishing supplies and, when 
applicable, of charter fees taken together are a proxy 
for the price of fishing in the absence of a market. 4 This 
information plus information on income, costs of sub-
stitutes, and catch rates can be used to estimate angler 
demand using what has come to be known as the travel 
cost method. The logic is simple-the farther an angler 
lives from a fishing site, the higher are his/her travel 
costs. It follows that the number of fishing trips an angler 
takes will decrease as travel costs increase, everything 
else held constant. This relationship, along with estimates 
of how demand changes when the catch rate increases or 
decreases, can be used to estimate the value of fishing trips 
and, indirectly , sport-caught fish. For example, the de-
mand curves shown in Figure 3B a rc based on Agnello's 
(R.J. Agnello, paper presented at the symposium on 
demand and supply of sport fishing, Charleston, SC, 
"Economic valuation of marine recreational fishing, " 
March 14-15 1988) travel cost demand model for flounder 
fishing trips. The lower demand curve corresponds to a 
catch rate of two fish per fishing trip whereas the upper 
demand curve traces higher levels of willingness-to-pay 
when the catch rate is three fish per fishing trip. If travel 
costs remain $25 for each trip (the average in Agnello's 
study), a fishery management rule which increases catch 
rate from two to three fish per trip also increases the 
angler's consumer surplus by $3.16 . (The similarity to the 
above results for seafood consumption is coincidental!) 
Likewise, rules which reduce catch rates will reduce an 
angler's consumer surplus. 
The contingent valuation method can be used to esti-
mate the value of fish to anglers, too , particularly when 
the effects of a proposed management rule on catch rate 
are uncertain. With the contingent valuation method, 
researchers design experiments that help anglers to reveal 
their maximum willingness-to-pay for specific increases in 
(or to prevent reductions in) catch rates. Depending on how 
the questions are phrased, the data can be used to estimate 
' In keeping with the introductory level of this document , the discuss ion 
is not complicated by discussing the opportunity costs of time. See Bxkstael 
et al. (1987). 
changes in consumer surplus directly or to estimate demand 
curves for sport-caught fish. 5 
Summary 
The salient points of this section are 
• Total economic value of fish is the maximum that con-
sumers are willing to pay for fish. 
• Economic value is not contingent on the existence of 
markets and prices nor on whether a fish resource is used 
for food or sport. 
• Consumer surplus is the net economic value that con-
sumers derive from fish. When consumer surplus is 
overlooked, fish stocks are grossly undervalued because 
consumers are ignored . 
Benefit-Cost Analysis _________ _ 
The above foundation in economic value is preparation for 
defining what constitutes a benefit and a cost in benefit-
cost analysis. It should become clear in this section that, 
in the context of benefit-cost analysis , a benefit is a gain 
of economic value whereas a cost is a loss of economic 
value. Thus, the more familiar notions of revenues and 
expenditures must be interpreted very carefully when used 
to help measure benefits and costs of a benefit-cost analysis. 
This section first distinguishes between expenditures and 
the concept of resource costs, or the foregone economic 
value of a resource, such as fish, when it is used for one 
purpose instead of something else. Next, net national 
benefits-the focus of a benefit-cost analysis-are defined 
as the difference between total economic value and resource 
costs that are "spent" to make fish available to consumers 
(including anglers). Net national benefits are composed of 
consumer surplus and its complement, producer surplus, 
or net economic value attributable to production. Also in 
this section, the relationship between economic efficiency 
and net national benefits is highlighted. Finally, the sec-
tion ends with a brief summary of the major points. 
Opportunity and Resource Costs 
Expenditures are so easily understood that the concept is 
hardly worth mentioning except to compare with resource 
costs (i.e., foregone economic value). Payments for goods 
and services purchased in markets and taxes for public 
' See McConnell" s (1985) chapter on recreational demand modeling for 
a discussion of, and more references to, the travel cost technique. Also, 
see the books by Cummings et al. (1986) and Mitchell and Carson (1989) 
for assessment of the contingent valuation method. Finally, hedonic travel 
cost analYSIS (Brown and Mendelsohn 1984) and, in general, household 
production (Bockstael and McConnel 1981; McConnell and Sutinen 1982) 
can be used to estimate nonmarket (or market-related) demands for sport-
caught fish . 
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services that are not supplied by markets (such as fishery 
management) are familiar to everyone. Expenditures are 
simply financial, or money costs. 
What appears to be confusing from controversies sur-
rounding allocation between commercial and recreational 
fisheries, however , are the implications of the symmetry 
between expenditures and revenues. M athematically, an 
industry ' s revenues are equal to its customers' expenditures 
and visa versa . Accordingly, in purely financial terms the 
overall effect of an exchange of m oney is zero . In Figure 
3A , for exam ple, at a price of $3 per pound , the house-
hold's total expenditu res of $17 .75 for flounder fillets are 
revenues for the retail seafood industry . T hus , the 
household is $17 .75 "poorer" and the retail outlet is $1 7.75 
" richer." Similarly, at a catch rate of two flounder per trip, 
the approximately $1 00 expended by the angler portrayed 
in Figure 3B are revenues for companies which sell gaso-
line, bait , tackle, and other goods and services required 
for fish ing flounder. However, the overall effect of the 
financial transactions between the angler and the suppliers 
of fishing goods and services is zero-money has simply 
been transferred, or redistributed . 
Expenditures are relevant to benefit-cost analyses only 
when they can be legitimately used to measure losses of 
economic value when resources such as labor, fishing 
vessels and other capital, and fish and other natural re-
sources are devoted to produce one good or service instead 
of something else. Because opportunities to produce some-
thing else valued by consumers a re foregone, the costs 
involved in making the decision are usually called oppor-
tunity costs. T hus, fish, such as flounder, which are sold 
to consumers in seafood markets are also valued by anglers, 
although the anglers' opportunities to catch and possibly 
eat the same fi sh are precluded . The reverse is also true . 
Although expenditures could be construed as a purely 
financial opportunity cost incurred by consumers and 
businesses (the same dollar cannot be spent on more than 
one commodity or resource), the focus here remains on the 
lost economic value of resources. In fact , because of the 
scope for am biguity, it makes more sense to refer to 
resource costs when discussing opportunity costs in the 
context of benefit -cost analysis . Whereas expenditures 
imply spending m oney, resource costs imply "spending" 
resources such as labor, capital, and fi sh stocks . 
Although the concepts a re dis tinct, the differences be-
tween expenditures and the opportunity costs of resource 
use are blurred when the latter are m easured. When mar-
kets for productive resources are competitive, market prices 
(including wages) reveal , or give a good indication of, the 
economic value to consumers of the goods or services that 
would otherwise have been produced by the same re-
sources. Also, when a change in the use of a resource is 
too small to effect a price change , total expenditures reveal, 
or measure , resource costs. That is, when these conditions 
involving the prices of resources and resource use are 
satisfied, payments by businesses and anglers to hire , buy, 
and rent resources to make fish available for consumption 
are mathematically equal to the opportunity costs of the same 
resources. 
Bear in mind, however, that expenditures do not always conve-
niently measure resource costs-that expenditures and resource costs 
are conceptually distinct. For example, taxes that redistribute 
wealth to the poor do not " spend" productive resources-
they are transfer payments of money. Also, prices and 
expenditures may not accurately measure resource costs 
when markets are not structured competitively or when the 
amount of a resource being used affects its price. However , 
these (and other) exceptions to when expenditures can be 
used to measu re resource costs are technical matters that 
are beyond the scope of this guide. See G ittinger (1982) for 
a more detailed discussion and comparison of expenditures 
and the opportunity costs of resource use . 
Net National Benefits 
Having covered economic value and resource costs, it is 
relatively straightforward to define net national benefi ts. 
In benefit-cost analysis, the net national benefits f rom using fish 
are maximum willingness-to-pay (i.e., total economic value) minus 
all opportunity costs of using resources to make fish available to con-
sumers (including anglers). Net national benefits are illustrated 
on Figure 4A with the a id of a standard depiction of de-
mand and supply as presented in other pedagogical 
writings (e .g ., Hushak 1987). Assuming that this supply 
curve traces the incremental resource costs of providing 
additional fish to consumers (analogous to how a demand 
curve traces the incremental economic value of additional 
fish to consumers), then the area beneath the supply curve is total 
resource costs, and the area between demand and supply is net national 
benefits. 
Actually, the phrase 'net national benefits' is trouble-
some because it is both misleading and ambiguous. It is 
misleading because the effect of a m anagement rule which 
allocates a fish stock between commercial and recreational 
fisheries generally will be felt regionally- not nationally-
where the commercial fishermen, anglers, and related con-
stituencies (including seafood consumers) reside . T he 
phrase is also ambiguous because the word , ' benefits,' 
could refer to purely financial benefits, such as revenues 
or, from a government's perspective, taxes, in addition to 
economic value as defined above. T hus , the area between 
the demand and supply curves in Figure 4A is better called 
net economic value . Nevertheless, given its widespread 
use by economists and others when referring to the 
economic value of fi sh stocks (including the Magnuson 
Act), I shall continue to use the phrase "net national 
benefits ," when speaking of net economic value. 
Notice in Figure 4B that the cost line actually divides 
net national benefits into two parts. The top part is con-
sumer surplus as was already discussed in the Economic 
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Net national benefits (i.e., net economic value) com-
prised consumer surplus and producer surplus. 
Value section. The bottom part of the area encompassing 
net national benefits is producer surplus. In practice, pro-
ducer surplus can be measured by subtracting the resource 
costs of providing fish to consumers from total revenues. 
Producer surplus is not , however, the profit an accoun-
tant might measure (i.e . , revenues minus expenditures) 
even when expenditures on resources measure their oppor-
tunity costs in other uses . That is , the value of the en-
trepreneurs' assets, including labor, capital , and land , must 
also be deducted from revenues when estimating producer 
surplus. 
It m ay be apparent from this discussion of producer 
surplus that revenues are not a benefit in the strict sense 
used in benefit-cost analysis . Although revenue da ta can 
be used to help estimate the economic value which is 
associated with production , all resource costs must be sub-
tracted from revenue in order to estimate producer surplus 
(the second component of net national benefits). Accord-
ingly , the so-called dockside' 'value " of fish in a landings 
market actually overestimates the net economic value 
associated with commercial fishing because resource costs 
are not subtracted. (And, obviously, revenues do not sub-
sume consumer surplus from seafood consumption .) 
In Figure 5, pie diagrams are used to display the 
elements of net national benefit s. In the seafood sector, net 
national benefits comprise consumer surplus, producer 
surplus in retail markets, and producer surplus from other 
suppliers in the marketing chain from commercial fish-
ermen to retailers, because these industries make fish 
avai lable to consumers . In the sport fishing sector , there 
is consumer surplus enjoyed by anglers plus producer 
surplus from the charter fishing industry. The economic 
values from the respective user groups are purposely drawn 
to he equal in order to focus on the important concepts 
and principles and to avoid giving the impression that total 
net economic value from one use is inherently greater than 
the other use. 
Economic Efficiency 
In the context of fishery management, economic efficiency 
relates to the total size of net national benefits from the 
collective use of a fish resource. In Figure 6, the center pie 
is supposed to illustrate the combined total net national 
benefits displayed by Figure 5 for the seafood and sport 
fi shing sectors of the (usually) regional economy. A 
management rule which increases total net nat ional benefits 
is said to increase the efficiency of uses of a fi sh resource-it 
increases the size of the net economic value pie that com-
mercial fishermen, anglers, fish wholesalers and retailers, 
the charter fishing industry, and seafood consumers share 
from a fish resource. Similarly , a policy which maximizes 
net national benefits gleans the most net economic value 
from a fish resource as is possible given constraints which 
are outside the control of management. In contrast, a loss 
in economic efficiency implies a loss of net national benefits, 
or net economic value. 
Notice that losses in economic surplus experienced by 
one or more groups would be consistent with increased ef-
ficiency provided that total net national benefits increase. 
In other words, the compensation test for judging whether efficiency 
is increased is whether " w inners" of economic value could com-
pensate " losers" and still come out ahead. That is why the 
"slices" of the ri ght-most pie in Figure 6 are not shown. 
In addition , one or more groups could experience a gain 
in consumer surplus and/or producer surplus even when 
use of a fish resource on the whole becomes less efficient. 
Thus, allocation can affect the relative sizes of the shares 
of net national benefits as well as the pie' s total size. 
Before exploring the alloca tion issue further, it is neces-
sary to report on the increasingly inappropriate use of 
input-outpu t analysis when net national benefits are esti-
mated. Allocation of a fish stock between commercial and 
recreational fi sheries is revisited in the Efficient Allocation 
section after input-output analysis is described in the Input-
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national benefits (i.e., net economic value) increase 
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Output Analysis section and contrasted to benefit-cost 
analysis in the Comparison of BCA and lOA section . 
Summary 
In conclusion, several important concepts and principles 
are worth repeating: 
• In the context of benefit-cost analysis, "benefits" are 
economic value as defined in the Economic Value sec-
tion in terms of consumers' maximum willingness-to-
pay for fish, and "costs" are the opportunity costs of 
resources used to make fish available to consumers. In 
this context, revenues are not benefits and expenditures 
are not costs (or benefits), although these quantities can 
be used to help measure producer surplus and resource 
costs when certain conditions are satisfied. 
• In benefit-cost analysis, net national benefits are total 
economic value minus total resource costs. Net national 
benefits, which are comprised of consumer surplus and 
producer surplus, are synonymous with net economic 
value. 
• Any action which increases net national benefits from 
the use of fish resources is said to increase efficiency, 
even if consumer surplus or producer surplus for some 
groups decline. Likewise, when net national benefits 
decline, efficiency goes down, and Americans suffer a 
loss of economic value from the use of their publicly 
owned fish stocks. 
As emphasized in this section, data on expenditures and 
revenues must be interpreted cautiously before they can 
be· used to measure economic value. This caution extends 
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Table 1 
Transactions flow table ($ millions). 
Commercial 
fishin g 
Purchasing sectors 
(i.e., intermediate demand) 
R ecreational 
fishing 
All other 
industries 
Final demand 
expenditures 
Households Exports Output 
Producing sectors 
Commercial fi shing n 0 
Recreational fishing 0 2 
All other industries 2 2 
7 0 
1 4· 
{3000 38000 
3 
3 
18996 
10 
10 
100000 
Primary inputs 
Value-added 7 3 
Imports 3 
Total inputs LO LU 
to the use of expenditures and revenues in input-output 
analysis, the subject of the next section. 
Input-Output Analysis ________ _ 
Benefit-cost analysis is used to determine whether a fishery 
regulation would increase or decrease efficiency. Although 
a benefit-cost analysis is not necessarily limited to the en-
tire Nation, this scope is appropriate when the Federal 
Government affects use of a natural resource that is, in fact, 
owned by all citizens . Nevertheless, benefit-cost analysis 
is flexible enough to be limited to a particular region of 
the country, or, if national in scope , it could be partitioned 
to isolat!" effects on particular regions or groups. As em-
phasized above, however, most of the effects of a fi shery 
management plan on consumers and industries a re prob-
ably felt regionally. Therefore, limitations on scope are not 
necessary m many cases. 
In contrast , input-output analysis (and related method-
ologies generally referred to as economic impact analysis) 
is used to determine how the same regulation would change 
regional income and other economic "activities," par-
ticularly revenues, expenditures, and employment. For 
example, input-output analysis is often used by m anufac-
turers and local and state governments to determine how 
fishery regulations might affect their share of markets and 
revenues, including taxes. Despite the disparate purposes, 
and despite the ambiguous relationship between changes 
in these economic activities and changes in consumer and 
producer surplus, input-output analysis is often improperly 
disguised as a surrogate for benefit-cost analysis . 
In order to explain why input-output analysis cannot 
assess changes in net economic value, a basic understand-
ing of the methodology is required. Accordingly, this sec-
tion begins with the foundations of input-output analysis, 
including a simple exercise to illustrate several points. 
49~92 (l 
7000 J(i (100 - 17004 
10001)0 48004 1998 100020 
Subsequently, several common misconceptions and pitfalls 
which characterize improper applications of input-output 
analysis are h ighlighted, including the scope for exag-
gerating the multiplier effects of new expenditures by con-
sumers. Along the way, reasons for why constituencies 
might understandably promote input-output analysis for 
their own benefit are pointed out. Keep in mind, however, 
that legitimate uses of input-output analysis are not being 
challenged. Rather, this section repudiates using input-output 
analysis as a surrogate for benefit-cost analysis. 
Elements of Input-Output Analysis 
Input-output analysis begins with a parsimonious account-
ing of financial links among industries, households , export 
markets, and, often, the public sector. The links are mea-
sured in terms of expenditures on the inputs (both 
resources and manufactured products that are intermediate 
to the production of final products purchased by con-
sumers) which are used to manufacture goods and services; 
revenues from the sale of products (i.e., output) and from 
taxes; and, income, or payments for labor and ownership 
of capital and privately-owned natural resources such 
as land. In practice, industries within a "region" (could 
be a town, county , state, or nation), such as seafood pro-
cessing or tackle manufacturing, are combined into some-
what homogeneous sectors having similar input require-
ments . For example, one national input-output model 
combines the thousands of industries in the United States 
into 496 sectors. In more focused, fisheries applications, 
however, the number of sectors are reduced further in order 
to facilitate analyses of the effects of a public policy on 
fisheries sectors. For example, in Hushak's input-output 
analysis of Ohio 's fisheries in Lake Erie (Hushak 1987; 
Hushak et al. 1984) , there are only 43 sectors, including 
commercial fishing, charter fishing, and marina and boat 
sales. 
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Although greatly simplified, the transactions flow table 
shown in T able 1 is patterned after Hushak et al. ' s (1984) 
input-output study. In Table 1, all industries belong to one 
of only three sectors: 1) the commercial fishing sector; 2) 
the recreational fishing sector; or 3) the considerably larger 
combination of all "other" industries. Whereas the com-
mercial fishing sector is restricted to only harvesting, the 
recreational fishing sector includes a wide variety of pro-
ducts and services such as charter boat fishing, boat sales , 
and sales of tackle, bait , and boat rentals by marinas. O ther 
industries with ties to commercial and recreational fishing, 
such as boat building, food processing, finance and in-
surance, lodging, retail food sales, and restaurant trade , 
are lumped in the "other" sector with the rest of the 
regional economy. 
Transaction flow tables reflect that industries both 
receive revenues for the output that they produce and in-
cur expenditures when they purchase inputs used to pro-
duce output. In Table 1, the "producing sectors" supply 
both processed , or intermediate, inputs (e .g., whole fish ; 
fiberglass for fishing poles) and final products (e.g., fi sh 
dinners a t a restaurant or fishing tr ips) to industries in the 
"purchasing sectors," to regional consumers, and to con-
sumers and industries in other regions. T he latter groups 
are referred to collectively as final deman d expenditures 
(hereafter, final expenditures will be used). For example, 
in this exercise nothing from the recreational fishing sec-
tor is sold to the commercial sector; $2 million of output 
from recreational fishing is sold to industries within the 
same, recreational fishing sector; $1 million of ou tput is 
sold to "other" industries; $4 million of output is sold 
directly to regional consumers; and $3 million of output 
is exported to industries and consumers outside the region 
for a total output of$10 million . (In practice, business in-
vestment and the public sector could be added to the final 
expenditures block, but the additional detail would un-
necessarily detract from this introduction .) 
Likewise, the two primary inputs sectors listed in Table 
1 supply the region's industries and consumers with im-
ports from other regions and with labor, capital , and 
privately owned natural resources such as land and caught-
fish from within the region . Labor, capital, and privately 
owned natural resources are subsumed in the value-added 
sector, where the phrase "value-added" refers to the in-
creased value of inter mediate products after productive 
resources such as labor, capital, and land are applied to 
convert a product into a form which is closer to that finally 
sold to consumers. For measurement purposes, the value-
added sector includes wages, salaries , capital depreciation, 
and rent (Richardson 1972) . For example, in this exercise, 
the value-added sector supplies $7 million oflabor, capital, 
and privately-owned natural resources to the commercial 
fishing sector, $3 million of inputs to the recreational fishing 
sector, and nearly $50 billion of inputs to the "other" 
industries. Similarly, the region imports the following 
amounts of goods and services : $1 million by the commer-
cial fishing sector; $3 million by the recreational sector ; 
$7 billion by the "other" sector; and $10 billion by con-
sumers. T he negative entry in the import/export cell is 
simply the sum of imports by regional consumers and the 
three purchasing sectors (an import is considered to be a 
"negative" export) . 
In contrast, the distribution of a sector 's expenditures 
on inputs appears down its column. For example, the com-
mercial fish ing sector's purchases oflabor, vessels, repairs, 
financing, insurance, and so on are distributed as $2 million 
from the " other" sector , $7 million of value-added inputs, 
and $1 million of imports for total expenditures of $10 
million; nothing is purchased from the commercial or 
recreational fi sheries in this exercise. In contrast, regional 
consumers purchase products and services amounting to 
$4 million from the recreational fishing sector, $38 billion 
from the "other " sector (including seafood from retail 
markets and restaurants), and $10 billion from industries 
outside the region. 6 Expenditures by anglers who live out-
side the region on fish ing trips and retail goods and ser-
vices such as lodging, souvenirs, and meals are distributed 
between the recreational fishing and " other" sectors under 
the exports column. 
From the perspective of a public servant, a primary 
reason for having information organized in a transactions 
flow table is to learn how a fishery regulation might change 
revenues (i .e., production), income, and employment in 
the regional economy through its effects on final expen-
ditures on seafood and recreational fi sh ing. As in benefit-
cost analysis, however, the actual execution of an input-
output analysis can be quite complicated . Consequently, 
only selected results are reported here. See Appendix B for 
more details. 
The results of an input-output analysis are determined 
by up to three levels of im pacts, or effects: 1) direct ef-
fects; 2) indirect effects; and 3) induced effects . The ini-
tial impacts of an increase in final expenditures for a sec-
tor's output are called direct effects and are measured by 
technical coefficients. Technical coefficients are calculated 
by dividing a sector ' s various direct input requirements 
by its total output. For example, from T able 1, each dollar 
increase in final expenditures for goods and services pro-
duced by the recreational fishing sector requires $0.20 of 
inputs from its own sector (i.e., $2 million divided by $10 
million) , $0 .20 of inputs from "other" industries, $0 .30 
of labor and other value-added inputs , and $0.30 of im-
ports. Likewise, the inputs required to satisfy each dollar 
increase in final expenditures for output from the commer-
cial fishing sector (only exports in this exercise) are $0 .20 
6Notice that a sector' s output (i .e. , revenue) and inputs (i.e. , expenditures) 
are equal, and that total value-added is equal to total final demand 
($50.002 billion) . T he latter condition assures that final expenditures (i.e., 
gross regional product) do not exceed total regional income . 
12 NOAA Technical Report NMFS 94 _______________________________ _ 
1-- - - -_· ---- - ----- -----.- - - - - ---- - ---- - - --- - ---, 
Table 2 
i 
I 
Economic impacts and multipliers corresponding to Table 1. 
- ------- -----_. - --- _. _ _ ._--- - - - --
Sector 
- - -_. ----- - .-- .- ---
I Impact_c_a_te_g_o_ry _ ___ _ __ _ Commercial fishing Recreational fishing "Other" industries 
- ------- -- - . - ---_ ._ -
I Output multiplier 
Type I (direct 
1.35 
0.7 
+ indirect) 
Direct income effect 
Total income effect (Keynes ian multiplier) 
Income multiplier (ratio multiplier) 
Direct employment effect 
Total employment effect (Keynesian multiplier) 
Employment multiplier (ra tio multiplier) 
0.88 
1.25 
0.00003 
0.000034 
1.12 
1.69 
n. 3 
0.59 
1. 98 
0.00002 
0.000029 
1.47 
1. 75 
0 .49992 
0.88 
1.75 
0.00001 
0.000018 
1.75 
Output multiplier 
Direct income effect 
Type II (Type I + induced) 
5.33 4.39 5.74 
0.49992 
2.87 Total income effect (Keynes ian multiplier) 
Income multiplier (ratio multiplier) 
Direct employment effect 
Total employment effect (Keynesian multiplier) 
Employment multiplier (ratio multiplier) 
0.7 
2.86 
4.09 
0.00003 
0.000073 
3.66 
'---- - - - - --- --- - - - -""- ---- -- .----
from "other" industries , $0 .70 of labor and other value-
added inputs, and $0.10 of imports . 
The initial , direct effects of an increase in final expen-
ditures on a region's output also give rise to indirect effects 
and induced effects as new-found revenues and income, 
respectively, are spent again and again on inputs and final 
goods and services. For example, in order to supply the 
recreational fishing sectm- with inputs so that it can satisfy 
the increased demand it faces for recreational goods and 
services, industries in the "other" sector must increase 
their own use of inputs from each sector in the region (see 
the " other" sector's column for specific input require-
ments). Similarly, increased use of labor , capital, and 
privately-owned natural resources presumably generates 
additional income for regional consumers which, in turn, 
induces additional expenditures on all final goods and ser-
vices produced in the region. In these ways, the regional 
industries and consumers "recycle," if you will, the money 
supply. At each step in the process, though , money " leaks" 
from the regional economy owing in large part to imports . 
Once all the spending and respending are computed, the 
overall effects of all rounds of spending on output from the 
regional economy can be expressed by indices called out-
put multipliers. Mathematically, the usual output multi-
plier is the overall, or total effect of a change in final 
expenditures on regional production divided by the initial , 
direct effect, where the total effect is the sum of the direct , 
indirect, and, sometimes, induced effects. In other words, 
the output multiplier is average production in the economy 
per dollar of direct effect. There are at least two general 
kinds of output multipliers. For a type-I multiplier , the 
total effect of an increase in final expenditures on regional 
n.3 
1.94 
6.48 
0.00002 
0.000056 
2.82 
5.74 
0.00001 
0.000057 
5.74 
production includes only the direct and indirect effects. In 
contrast, a type-II multiplier also includes induced effects 
generated by regional consumers. 
Table 2 lists the output multipliers calculated from the 
transactions flow table reported in Table 1. For example, 
the type-! output multiplier for recreational fishing is 1.69, 
meaning that, on average , each $ 1 increase in final expen-
ditures for output produced by the recreational fishing sec-
tor requires $1.69 of inputs from all producing sectors in 
the region (including recreational fishing) once indirect ef-
fects are taken into account. The type-I output multiplier 
of 1.35 for commercial fishing reveals that each $1 increase 
in fmal expenditures for output from the commercial fishing 
sector requires a total of $1.35 in output from the region . 
Common M isconceptions and Pitfalls 
The elements of input-output analysis were presented in 
order to help identify several common misconceptions and 
pitfalls which characterize the controversy over fishery 
allocations between commercial and recreational fisheries . 
Several problems surround the interpretation and use of 
multipliers. 
Output multipliers are tremendously important to in-
dustries that expect to benefit or lose financially from a 
fishery management regulation, particularly an allocation 
rule. Their interests center, quite understandably, on what 
affects the profit and market share of their industry's 
revenues pie, but certainly not on the overall effect of 
management on net national benefits. From a broader 
perspective, however, if a fishery regulation results in, say, 
anglers spending less money on recreational fishing, the 
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anglers will most likely spend more money on other forms 
of leisure. Likewise, even if a proposed regulation is 
expected to reduce industrial output within the region 
being studied, financial gains from increased exports by 
other regions will usually offset the loss. Overall, then, when 
a fishery sector or a region loses money, other sectors in the region 
or, possibly, in other regions will usually gain money. Thus, when 
marine pollution off the northeast coast of the United States 
caused tourism and seafood consumption to decline in 
1988, consumers spent their money at other resorts. As 
introduced in the Benefit-Cost Analysis section, purely financial 
exchanges are transfer payments, the overall effect of which is 
zero. 
Consequently, it is not surprising when regional econ-
omists remark that output (i .e., revenue) multipliers "are 
of little economic significance" from the public sector's 
perspective because they do not have a discern able rela-
tionship to net economic values (Archer 1977, p. 517). 
Similarly, Scott (1984, p. 253) concluded that in general 
" ... there is no particular relationship (even in algebraic 
sign) between changes in net societal [i.e., national] bene-
fits .. . and changes in regional incomes." That is, although 
revenues subsume producer surplus, it is not possible to state 
a priori how producer surplus changes when regional output changes. 
Furthermore, consumer surplus is completely disregarded in input-
output analysis. 
An emphasis on expenditures, revenues, and output 
multipliers in input-output analysis also leads to at least 
two curious conclusions when the logic is extended to 
similar circumstances. First, it behooves owners of com-
mercial fishing operations, or any business, for that mat-
ter, including tackle manufacturers and boat builders, to 
minimize financial costs and, thereby, increase profitabil-
ity. Consequently, to compare the expenditures of com-
mercial fishermen and anglers is improper. In fact, net 
national benefits are actually enhanced when businesses, including 
commercial fishing operations, minimize use of productive inputs 
because the remaining inputs can be used to produce other goods and 
servIces. 
Second, it follows from the illogic surrounding the purely 
financial indices that injury to fish stocks caused by sewage 
pollution, toxic waste disposal, or disasters such as oil or 
chemical spills (recall the Exxon-Valdez spill) are a regional 
benefit because they generate regional expenditures on in-
puts used for clean-up and habitat restoration. Clearly, 
though, pollution will only diminish the value that con-
sumers and producers derive from fish. To make matters 
worse, resource costs will increase because inputs which 
are devoted to monitoring, assessing, and mitigating 
damages are removed from the production of other goods 
and services valued by consumers . These logical extensions 
of popular input-output arguments should raise very 
serious doubts about the use of output multipliers and 
whether expenditures and revenues themselves reflect 
economic value. 
In contrast to output multipliers, changes in income (i.e., 
payments to value-added inputs such as labor and owners 
of capital and land) can, in principle, be used to estimate 
changes in producer surplus (Harris and Norton 1978; 
Hushak 1987) . Also, changes in employment brought 
about by a fishery management rule are potentially estim-
able from input-output analysis . Nevertheless, several 
misconceptions and pitfalls surrounding the use of even in-
come and employment multipliers need to be highlighted 
here. 
Multiplier effects on regional income and employment 
are determined from the direct and total income and 
employment effects of a change in final expenditures (Table 
2; see Appendix B for details). The direct income effect of 
a change in final expenditures is the average income in a 
sector per dollar of the sector's output. The same is true 
for employment. (Hereafter, the discussion focuses on in-
come, although the remarks apply equally well to employ-
ment.) For example, in the transactions flow table, value-
added inputs employed by the recreational fishing sector 
earn, on average in the economy, nearly $0.30 for each 
dollar of the recreational fishing sector's output (i.e., $3 
million/$lO million). Respending of revenues by the recrea-
tional fishing industries ultimately leads to a total income 
effect of nearly $0.59 of income per dollar of output by the 
industrial sector. Finally, the total income effect increases 
to $1.94 per dollar of output when respending of additional 
income earned by regional consumers is taken into account. 
The analogous income effects on the commercial side are 
0.70, 0.88, and 2 .86, respectively (Table 2). 
Typically, the various income effects are used to generate 
the more familiar, albeit increasingly abused, ratio multi-
plier. As its name might imply, a ratio multiplier for in-
come is generated by dividing the total income effect by 
the initial direct income effect. (For future reference, it is 
important to notice that income is divided by income.) For 
example, the recreational fishing sector's type-I ratio 
multiplier for income is 1.98, (i .e . , 0.59/0.30). That is, on 
average in the present economy, once respending by the 
industrial sectors is taken into account, the total income 
effect of an increase in final expenditures for goods and 
services produced by the recreational fishing sector is nearly 
two times greater than the initial direct effect of final ex-
penditures on income . On the commercial side, the type-I 
ratio multiplier for income is less in this exercise-1. 25 
(i .e., 0 .88/0 . 70)-only because the direct income effect is 
proportionally greater (nearly 80 % of the total income ef-
feet) than in the recreational fishing sector (51 % of the total 
income effect). The type-II multipliers for both sectors are 
greater than their type-I counterparts because of the addi-
tional induced effects of respending by regional consumers. 
(The type-I and type-II ratio multipliers for employment 
are calculated analogously.) 
Because of the way that they are calculated, ratio multipliers ac-
tually do not provide much useful information beyond an indication 
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oj the self-sufficiency oj the economy being studied. For exc.mple, 
without imports and other " leaks" from the economy such 
as savings, money would continually recycle wi thin a 
regional economy, resulting in irifinite total effect~ and, 
therefore, irifinite type-II multipliers .7 Accordingly, the 
larger the regional economy, the larger a multiplier tends 
to be when imports decrease in proportion to total regional 
production. Also, in a regional economy with negligible 
leaks, the magnitude of type-I multipliers tends toward in-
finity as the proportion of value-added inputs to total out-
puts decreases (i.e., as the direct income effect decreases) . 
Because of the influence of the size of an economy on the size of ratio 
multipliers, extreme caution is advised when comparing multipliers 
between regions and from different studies. Unless the context is 
specified, multipliers are meaningless (Archer 1981). 
Extreme caution is also advised when ratio multipliers 
are used to predict how a fishery management rule will change 
regional income. Although seemingly appropriate, one cannot 
predict the total impact on regional income of a change in final 
~xpenditures by multiplying a ratio multiplier by the change. The 
approach is mathematically illogical because, unlike that 
for output multipliers, the denominator of a ratio multiplier 
for income is income, not expenditures; hence, the units of 
the denominator do not "cancel out" when multiplied by 
final expenditures. Instead, the total income effect-the 
numerator of a ratio multiplier, or what Archer (1977) calls 
a Keynesian multiplier-should be multiplied by the ex-
pected change in final expenditures to determine changes 
in income . (The same rule applies to employment effects.) 
The results from Table 2 help to emphasize when ratio 
multipliers are inappropriately used to predict economic 
impacts on income. In particular , notice that the total 
income and employment effects-the Keynesian multi-
pliers- can be much smaller than their ratio counterparts. 
Consequently. total impacts of a change in final expen-
ditures on regional income and employment tend to be ex-
aggerated when ratio multipliers are incorrectly used as 
just described . Perhaps more importantly, though , im-
proper use of ratio multipliers can lead to incorrect infer-
ences about how allocation might affect income or enploy-
ment in a region. For example, the type-I and type-II ratio 
multipliers for income are greater for recreational fishing 
than for commercial fishing in this exercise . However , the 
relative sizes of the total income effects- again, the Keyne-
sian multipliers-are actually greater in the commercial 
fishing sector (Table 2) . Consequently, in this exero:ise. a 
$1 increase in final expenditures for output from the com-
mercial fishing sector might actually have a greater impact 
on regional income than an equal increase in final expen-
ditures for recreational fishing despite the relative size of 
the ratio multipliers. As noted above, this reversal arises 
because the direct income effects in the commercial fishing 
'The infinite multiplier arises because of constant returns to scale and 
fixed input ratios . 
sector a re proportionally greater with respect to indirect 
and induced effects than in the recreational fishing sector. 
The overall impad of a change in final expenditures on income 
or employment in an economy depends on both the size of the Keyne-
sian multiplier and on the expected change in final expenditures 
because these components are multiplied to calculate the overall 
impact. In fact , information on expected changes in final 
expenditures actually requires an estimate of consumer 
demands for fish as illustrated in Figure 3 . For example, 
even if a management rule is expected to increase catch 
rate among anglers, the rule will not necessarily increase 
regional income unless the higher catch-rate increases the 
demand for fishing trips-regardless of the size of the 
Keynesian multiplier. 
Difficult problems remain, however, even when Keyne-
sian multipliers are used to project changes in income and 
employment. Only two problems are mentioned here . 
First, overlooking likely adjustments in input use in other 
sectors of the economy could deceive fishery managers and 
policy makers . For example, projections based on a region's 
current industrial structure and employment of value-added 
inputs tacitly assume that there is sufficient productive 
capacity and inputs to satisfy an increase in final expen-
ditures by increasing output. When employment oflabor. 
capital, and natural resources is high or when unemployed 
resources lack the necessary skills and characteristics to 
meet the increased demand, an increase in production in 
one sector could easily be at the expense of another sec-
tor ' s production (Haveman and Krutilla 1968).8 Also, im-
ports from other regions are viewed negatively by the 
region enclosed by a study (sometimes narrowly defined 
as a community); yet regions which supply the imports cer-
tainly consider their exports to be beneficial. Taken together, 
it is not clear, a priori, whether regional income-including pro -
ducer surplus-or employment will increase or decrease even when 
Keynesian multipliers are used, unlus the levels of these activities 
with management are compared to levels without management. 9 
Summary 
Input-output analysis was originally developed to describe 
the links among industries (in terms of expenditures and 
reven ues), final expenditures (e. g., consumer expenditures 
"Impacts are generally based upon the average relationships for the ex-
isting economy, although marginal changes are much preferred . 
9Gross National (Regional) Product and Gross National (Regional) In-
come should not be confused with total impacts determined from an input-
output analysis. In general , only total final " demand" measures Gross 
National (Regional) Product, and only income for value-added inputs 
measures Gross National (Regional) rncome (Miller and Bla ir 1985). 
In thi s exercise, gross regional production and gross regional income are 
both $50,002. Total regional output-$100,020-is considerably greater 
because it. " double-counts" what labor and other value-added inputs con-
trilJUte to the final product. Consequently , regional transaction tables 
and associated indirect, induced , and total effects must be interpreted 
carefully when determining contributions to the economy. 
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and exports to markets outside the region), and primary 
inputs, such as labor, in a regional economy. The method-
ology is important in projecting how a change in expen-
ditures by the final demand sector affects the distribution 
of income, employment, and revenues among a region's 
industrial sectors. The ability to project financial effects 
on industries is important to constituencies and commu-
nities which would benefit or be harmed by a fishery alloca-
tion. Nevertheless, public officials may favor looking at the 
overall effects of a fishery policy on all constituencies, even 
when the officials' purview is restricted to a region. Ac-
cordingly, the following remarks should be kept in mind 
whenever input-output analysis is incorrectly casted as 
benefit-cost analysis: 
• Output , or revenue effects-including output multi-
pliers-generated in an input-output analysis are irrele-
vant when discussing net economic value. 
• Ratio multipliers are deceptive and should be ignored 
when one wants to project how an allocation rule will 
affect income and employment. Instead, Keynesian 
multipliers, or total income and employment effects, 
should be used in conjunction with expected changes 
in final expenditures to determine overall economic 
impacts. 
• In isolation, even Keynesian multipliers cannot reveal 
how a fishery management regulation will affect income 
and employment. Notwithstanding legitimate concerns 
about compensatory adjustments in other sectors and 
regions, both Keynesian multipliers and the expected 
changed in consumer expenditures and purchases in 
export markets are required to estimate the overall, 
net impact of a regulation on regional income and 
ern ploymen t. 
• Input-output analyses of fishery management policies 
tend to be restricted to the regional level and, therefore, 
ignore compensatory changes in income and employ-
ment in other regions . This limitation could lead to 
disagreements between regional and national perspec-
tives on fishery management depending on the size of 
the region. Often, however, the impacts of an alloca-
tion rule are concentrated within the management agen-
cy's regional purview. 
• Because of the link between producer surplus and in-
come earned by labor and owners of capital and natural 
resources, input-output analysis could, conceivably, be 
used to estimate changes in producer surplus in sectors 
indirectly related to fisheries; however, this extension of 
input-output analysis is in a developmental stage. Fur-
thermore, even a satisfactory extension of input-output 
analysis would still ignore consumer surplus. For this, 
and the many other reasons described in section IV , 
input-output analysis (and other forms of economic im-
pact analysis) cannot be a surrogate for benefit-cost 
analysis . 
Comparison of Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) 
and Input-Output Analysis (lOA) ___ _ 
In this section, benefit-cost analysis and input-output 
analysis are briefly contrasted, side-by-side, using Table 3 
Table 3 
Comparison of input-output analysis and benefit-cost analysis. 
----------------------------------------- - ------------------------
Category 
A. Focus 
B. Boundary 
C. Determines changes in net economic 
value? 
J) consumer surplus? 
2) producer surplus? 
3) effi ciency? 
D. Emphasis on net effects of regulation? 
E. Weight given to indirect and induced 
effects 
F. Weight given to distribution of 
revenues and expenditures 
G. Distribution of effects over time? 
Economic impact analysis 
economic activity (revenues, expen-
ditures, taxes, income, employment) 
all industries in a regional economy ; 
consumers are disregarded except for 
thei r expendi tures 
no 
potentially 
no 
yes , but usually not analyses 
developed by constituencies 
generally very important despite com-
pensations in other regions 
a principle application by constituencies 
no 
Benefit-cost analysis 
economic value (consumer and pro-
ducer surpluses) and resource costs 
generally , consumers and only indus-
tries which make fish available to 
consumers 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
considered negligible owing to ad -
justments elsewhere in economy 
none 
yes 
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as a guide. The comparison concerns how the methods are generally 
understood and applied (as opposed to a theoretical ideal). Most 
differences involve what is being m easured and what in-
dustries are being included. 
Recall from the Input-Output Analysis section that 
input-output analysis describes the distribution of produc-
tion and input requirements for all industries within a regional 
economy, although the industries are aggregated into a 
manageable number of somewhat homogeneous sectors 
based upon similarities among input requirements. The 
scope of benefit-cost analysis tends to be regional, but the 
analysis is generally restricted to only those industries which 
harvest, distribute, process, and retail the resource being regulated-
yield from afish stock. Possible effects in related markets for 
inputs used to harvest and make fish available to consumers 
generally arc assumed to be negligible or short-lived in 
benefit-cost analysis owing to input substitution in other 
markets. That is, after initial impacts of a regulation, 
primary inputs such as labor, capital, and natural resources 
(e. g., iron and aluminum used to make engines and fishing 
gear) are assumed to be hired or bought by other industries 
at equivalent prices. 
Also recall from above that benefit-cost analysis and 
input-output analysis focus on different types of informa-
tion . Benefit-cost analysis focuses on economic value and 
resource costs and on whether a regulation will increase 
economic efficiency from use of publicly owned fish s:ocks. 
The strong emphasis placed on measuring changes in net national 
benefits-consumer surplus and producer sUlj)lus-is a ha'lmark 
of benefit-cost ana~ysis and a significant d!fference between it amI 
input-output analysis which inherently ignores changes in consumer 
surplus and does not appear to be developed sufficiently to measure 
regional changes in producer surplus . In contrast, the garden 
variety of input-output analyses which are promoted by 
constituencies tend to focus on the distribution of financial 
gains and losses for their respective sectors instead of on 
estimating net changes in income or employment. 
What constitutes direct, indirect, and induced effects 
needs to be reviewed, too, because of differences in mean-
ings and because of implications for what is and is not 
measured. In input-output analysis, the " direct" effects 
of a regulation which influences final demand expenditures 
are spread across primary and intermediate inputs from the 
entire economy, including labor, capital, and privately owned 
natural resources such as land and caught-fish. Also, often 
when recreational fishing is being evaluated, consumption 
of goods and services which are unrelated to fishing trips, 
such as meals and souvenirs, are "direct" effects even when 
recreational fishing comprises only part of a vacation or 
trip . 
"Indirect" and " induced" effects in input-output anal-
ysis arise only after increased revenues and income are 
respent in the economy. Note that depending on how the 
transaction flow table is configured, wholesale and reta il 
trade of fish products could ar ise only from "indirect" and 
Seafood Sector 
Con.umer ,urplu. 
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Figure 7 
Benefit-cost analysis concentrates on changes in net national 
benefits (i .e., net economic value) associated with consumers and 
with industries which make fish available to consumers. 
. 'induced" effects. Finally, consumer surplus enjoyed by 
seafood consumers and anglers, either from inside or out-
side the region, is disregarded in input-output analysis. In 
input-output analysis, consumers are important only for 
their expenditures . 
In contrast, ((direct" effects in benefit-cost analysis generally 
are confined to changes in net economic value in markets which trade 
the regulatedfish resource (Fig. 7) . In the seafood sector, direct 
effects include both consumer surplus and producer surplus 
for commercial fi shing companies and for other industries 
which distribute, process, and retail fish. On the recrea-
tion side, the analogous vertical integration of industries 
which catch and handle fish is condensed because the angler 
is , in effect, a sole "producer" except when charter ser-
vices are hired to gain access to fish stocks. Otherwise, 
anglers combine bait, tackle, fishing poles , ice, and, in 
some cases, private or rental boats to catch, process, and 
consume fish.f o 
Also in benefit-cost analysis, "indirect" effects concern 
markets for all inputs other than fish which are employed 
by the fi shing sectors. The long list includes labor, boats, 
IOThis inclusive description abstracts from the variety of anglers, somt' 
of whom catch but do not land and consume fish . Overall , however , 
it fits in to a general type of household production framework . See McCon-
nell and Sutinen (1982) for an application to fisheries. 
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engines, fishing gear, tackle, gasoline, bait, and ice (most 
of which are part of "direct" effects in input-output 
analysis), but, unlike input-output analysis, strictly ex-
cludes "induced" effects from the sale of products un-
related to fish or fishing such as souvenirs, visits to tourist 
attractions, and meals eaten on the fishing trip. However, 
two basic and sensible assumptions of benefit-cost analysis 
are that : 1) losses attributable to obsolete inventories of 
processed products such as fishing gear will be short-lived 
(and possibly negligible if the regulations are phased in); 
and 2) all primary inputs other than fish (many of which 
are part of "direct" impacts in input-output analysis) will 
be employed in other industries producing similarly valued 
commodities if not engaged in fish-dependent trades. Con-
sequently, the possible" indirect" and" induced" com-
ponents of changes in net national benefits are generally 
assumed to be zero unless prices in these related markets 
are expected to change. l1 
A final issue concerns the temporal distribution of ef-
fects. Input-output analysis abstracts from time , giving no 
indication of when or for how long impacts might take 
place . In contrast, the net economic value and resource 
costs of a proposed fishery regulation are intimately con-
nected with time in a benefit-cost analysis, usually through 
the dynamics of the fish population and consideration of 
income flows to those affected. 
Efficient Allocation __________ _ 
An appropriately standardized benefit-cost analysis of 
allocation between commercial and recreational fisheries 
would determine whether any of a set of proposed man-
agement measures would increase net national benefits 
from the use of fish for food and sport. As emphasized in 
the Comparison of BCA and lOA section, the comparison 
would include all relevant users from harvesters to con-
sumers but exclude purely financial considerations 
(Fig. 7). Taken one step further, the analysis would iden-
tify which combination of shares would maximize net 
national benefits from use of a total allowable catch . D e-
pending on the costs of management, the search for the 
most efficient allocation system could be tantamount to 
finding the one which maximizes the sum of consumer and 
producer surpluses in both uses . This section draws on 
the foundation of previous sections in order to illustrate 
several important-and possibly surprising-properties of 
such a maximization. In order to simplify the exercise, 
research , enforcement, and administration costs are as-
sumed to be equal across allocations. These costs could be 
accounted for, however , in an actual application . See 
II This assumption is weakened by deviations from full employment and 
from pure competition in input markets and by anything short of in-
stantaneous adjustment in inpu t markets and costless relocation of inputs. 
Rothschild et al. (1977) and Sutinen (1980) for related 
presentations. 
The guide also culminates here by underscoring two 
mistaken arguments which characterize ,the commercial-
recreational controversy. As emphasized previously, the 
improper use of input-output analysis to determine the 
relative economic value of commercial and recreational 
fisheries is promoted by sport fishing constituencies when 
revenues from the sale of fishing supplies and other goods 
and services to anglers (even goods and services which are 
unrelated to recreational fishing) are greater than dockside 
revenue and, sometimes , retail sales of seafood to con-
sumers . The fishing industry has also indulged in this 
reasoning. This revenues-argument was discussed in the 
Benefit-Cost Analysis section and the Input-Output Anal-
ysis section. Also, exclusive use of a fish resource can-
not be allocated even on the basis of which use derives 
the greatest total net economic value, let alone on the 
basis of total revenues (or expenditures) . Contrary to this 
"total value argument," tradeoffs in net national benefitsfrom 
changes in shares of a catch quota must be used to identify an 
efficient allocation of a fish stock between commercial and recrea-
tional fisheries. 
An Illustration 
In Figure 8, let the entire seafood sector be represented 
by a single demand curve that combines final demand by 
consumers with "derived" demands for intermediate fish 
products by all suppliers which distribute , process, and 
market fish in the seafood sector (Fig . 8, A and B). That 
is, the entire seafood sector's demand curve portrayed in 
Figure 8 actually includes producer surplus (as well as con-
sumer surplus) in all markets which eventually make 
seafood available to consumers. Accordingly , the demand 
curve for the seafood sector subsumes consumer surplus 
and producer surpluses for each industry except the com-
mercial fishing industry itself. 12 
The anglers' demand curve for sport-caught fish is por-
trayed in Fig. 8, C and D. Attributing all consumer surplus 
of spoTtfishing to the sport-caught fish would overestimate 
the value of sport-caught fish to anglers because other fac -
tors, including being outdoors and camaraderie, are also 
part of the fishing experience (Dawson and Wilkins 1981; 
Fedler 1984) . Accordingly , only the demand for sport-
caught fish is illustrated in Figure 8 . 
For simplicity, let producer surplus be zero for owners 
of commercial fishing vessels, although this assumption is 
false for " highliners " in a fishery . Also, the sport fishery 
could be diversified by adding producer surplus for the 
charter boat industry. However, expanding this exercise 
12Just et al. (1982) developed the general theory of "equilibrium " sector 
demand models. Unlike dockside demand, equilibrium demand for land-
ings allows prices in other related markets to adjust endogenously. 
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Seafood Sector 
B61DRE REGULATION AFTER REGULA110N 
AFTER REGULATION 
Sport Fishing Sec;tor 
to include these industries would only complicate the task 
without adding new insights . 
As is usually the case, assume that resource costs can 
be accurately measured by the prices of fishing gear and 
other goods and services used to catch fish . Accordingly , 
let the initial resource costs of landing fish in the seafood 
sector be equal to the exvessel price of $4 per pound of fish . 
Also, a t the current stock size let the resource costs of bait 
and other factors used to gain access to and to catch sport 
fish be constant at $6 per pound . That is, the anglers' costs 
of catching fish translates to $6 per pound. 
Assume also that the hypothetical, open access fishery 
currently suffers from recruitment overfishing and that cur-
ren t landings of the 16 million pounds are not sustainable, 
but that a maximum sustainable yield of 12 million pounds 
offish a year is considered by management to be "optimal" 
for increasing and stabilizing the stoCk.13 At the larger 
13T his simplified exercise abstracts from a formal economic assessment 
which simultaneously solves for the most efficient total allowable catch 
and shares . Also , I ignored stock externali ties and the associatec inter-
temporal social costs which give ri se to the open access problem. See 
Bishop and Samples (1980) and M cConnell and Sutinen (1979) for 
B 
o 
Figure 8 
Effects of allocation on net national benefits (i.e ., 
net economic value) in the seafood and sport fishing 
sectors. 
stock size, let resource costs decline to $2 and $5 per pound 
in the seafood and sport fishing sectors, respectively, 
because the larger stock will increase productivity of both 
commercial fishermen and anglers (Fig. 8, B and D). If 
all resource costs associated with fishery management are 
independent of the management strategy (admittedly a 
naive assumption), how should the total allowable catch 
of 12 million pounds be allocated in order to maximize total 
net economic value? Other potentially important aspects 
of this allocation question , such as competition for space 
or local concentrations of /ish and how fish size affects com-
mercial and recreational value, could be factored in, but 
this complexity would also unnecessarily complicate the 
analysis. 
If management followed the total value argument, or 
even, in this exercise, the revenues-argument, the species 
would be designated a game fish because both net economic 
bioeconomic models of commercial and recreational ha rvesting in an 
optimal control framework. However, the exercise conforms to stan-
dard management practice of first using biological criteri a to determine 
total allowable catch from a stock or management unit , and then 
allocating total allowable catch to user-groups. 
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value and total expenditures in the sport fishery ($49 and 
$42 million, respectively) are greater than their commer-
cial counterparts ($27 and $36 million, respectively; Fig. 
8, A and C) . In fact, though , the allocation that maximizes 
total net economic value in the combined sectors actually 
slightly favors the seafood sector in this exercise! 
To understand this possibly surprising result, first assign 
the entire total allowable catch of 12 million pounds of fish 
to commercial fishermen as begun in Figure 8B (the final 
shares are independent of the starting point). Next ask 
whether total net economic value would increase if the com-
mercial fishing quota is reduced by, say, one million to 
11 million pounds and the anglers' quota is simultaneous-
ly increased from zero to one million pounds . The parti-
tions of the respective net value "triangles" in Figure 8, 
Band D show that the approximate $0.33 million loss in 
net economic value in the seafood sector is considerably 
less than the $14.00 million gain in consumer surplus by 
anglers , therefore, the new allocation results in an overall 
net gain of about $13.67 million in total net economic 
value . 
Next ask whether total net economic value would in-
crease further if the commercial fishing sector's share of 
the catch quota is reduced by a second million pounds of 
fish and the recreational quota is increased by one million 
to two million pounds? Total net economic value increases 
by $11.00 million (i .e ., $12.00 million minus $1.00 million) 
from this second adjustment. The allocation of a third one 
million pounds increases total net economic value too, but, 
again, by a lesser amount ($10.00 million minus $1.67 
million, or $8.33 million). The process continues until, 
finally, total net economic value is maximized when about 
Figure 9 
Total net national benefits (i.e., net economic value) from alloca-
tion of the 12 million pound total allowable catch quota. 
5.6 million pounds of fish are allocated to anglers, and 
about 6.4 million pounds offish are allocated to the seafood 
sector. 
Any adjustment in this maximally efficient allocation in 
favor of standard notions of equity or fairness would reduce 
total net economic value from use of the fish stock . For 
example, making the allocation equal by further reducing 
the commercial quota by about 0.4 million to 6 million 
pounds would increase consumer surplus for anglers by 
$1.27 million , but at the same time reduce net economic 
value in the seafood sector by more-by $1.45 million . In 
contrast, a share system which maintains the historical pro-
portions of landings-56 % for the commercial fishery 
(9/16), or 6.8 million pounds, and 44% for the sport fishery 
(7/16), or 5 .2 million pounds-would diminish total net 
economic value too . Relative to the maximally efficient 
allocation, net economic value in the seafood sector in-
creases by $1.35 million with an increased share of 0.4 
million pounds, but net economic value in the sport fishing 
sector decreases by $1.55 million. (This tradeoff is not ob-
vious from Figure 8 .) 
The effi cient allocation of the 12 million pound total 
allowable catch may be easier to envision in Figure 9. Here, 
the vertical axis records net economic value from Figure 
8, Band D, for the seafood sector, the sport fishing sec-
tor, and the two sectors combined. The horizontal axis 
records total allowable catch. The possible commercial and 
sport fishing shares run in opposite directions , such that 
at any point along the horizontal axis, the sum of the two 
shares is 12 million pounds . 
The curve that increases steadily from left to right traces 
the cumulative amount of consumer and producer surpluses 
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in the seafood sector as the commercial fishery's shafe ill' 
creases from zero to 12 million pounds. For example, when 
exvessel price is held constant at $2 per pound as in Figure 
BB (this is still assumed to measure resource costs), net 
economic value in the seafood sector increases from $0 to 
$ 7.7 million and then to $14.7 million when the corr. mer-
cial fishery's share increases from zero to one million and 
then to two million pounds . Similarly, the curve that ill-
creasesfrom right to lift accumulates the anglers' consumer 
surplus as their share of total allowable catch increases frum 
zero to 12 million pounds. For example, when the resource 
costs of sport-caught fish are $5 per pound (Fig. BD), con· 
sumer surplus increases from $0 to $14 million and then 
to $26 million as the anglers' share increases from zero to 
one and then to two million pounds. Total consumer 
surplus for anglers levels off at about 7.5 million pounds 
because, in this exercise, the anglers are not willing to pay 
$5 to catch additional Jish (see the anglers' demand in 
Fig. BD). 
The "hill " in Figure 9 traces total net economic '/alue 
in the combined sectors for each possible share sy~tem . 
Graphically , this hill is the vertical summation of net 
economic value in each sector. It is clear from this top curve 
that total net economic value is maximized at the apex, 
or at about $90 million where, as above, the anglers' share 
is about 5.6 million pounds of fish and the commercial 
fishermen's share is 6.4 million pounds. Any deviation 
from these shares would reduce total net economic value, 
including, as we saw above, "fair" allocations such as an 
equal apportionment or a system that is proportional to 
historical or current use. 
Although not obvious from Figure 9, the net economic 
value of the 5 .6 millionth fish in the sport fishery and the 
6.4 millionth fish in the seafood sector are equal at nearly 
$3.75 14 This latter property of the maximally efficient 
allocation illustrates the economic principle that in order 
to maximize the total net economic value from using fish 
I'This and other results of this exercise can be shown mathematically. 
The demand models used to generate Figures f.l and Y. 
Seafood sector: q; 
Sport fishing sector : q, 
15 - 1.5c! 
1fI - 0.5< . . 
where qj and q, are quantities demanded in the seafood and sport fi sh ing 
sectors, respectively , a nd cj and c, are the corresponding costs of fi sh . 
Holding costs constant at $2 per pound in the seafood sector and $5 
per pound in the sport fishing sector, the expressions for net value (v) 
in the respecti ve sectors are 
Seafood sector: Vj 
Sport fishin g sector: v, 
IOqj - 0 .335q/ - 2qj 
20q, - 1. OOOq/ - 5q,. 
Next. maximize the sum of Vj and v, with respect to the shares , qj and 
q" subject to the constraint imposed by the total allowable catch 
quoia: 
:Vlaximize "r v (vj + v,) + 1](12 - qj - q,), 
for food and sport, an allocation must equate marginal 
net economic values from each conflicting use of the fish 
stock. IS 
Summary 
The exercise in this section emphasized the importance of 
determining efficient allocations of a fish stock on the basis 
of incremental tradeoffs in net economic values-the dif-
ference between total economic value and total resource 
costs-when different uses are in conflict. Had the total 
value-argument (or revenues-argument) been applied and 
the total allowable catch been awarded completely to 
anglers, total net economic value would be only about 
$56 .25 million (i.e., the entire area under the anglers' 
demand curve in Figure BD and above the $5 cost line) 
instead of the $90 m illion achieved by the efficient alloca-
t ion that includes the seafood sector. Indeed, in this exer-
cise the stock would be underutilized if the entire total 
allowable catch of 12 million pounds was awarded to 
anglers because sport fishing costs amounting to $5 per 
pound of sport-caught fish result in a harvest of only about 
7.5 million pounds by anglers (Fig. BD). 
Also notice that total net economic value in the regulated 
fishery (i .e . , $90) is greater than under open access condi-
tions (i.e . , $76 million-see Fig. B, A and C). Therefore, 
the regulation would pass the benefit-cost criterion to 
increase net economic value (provided that the increase 
in the total resource costs of management-including 
administrative, scientific assessments , and enforcement 
costs-is less than the increase in consumer and producer 
surpluses over time). 
Finally , in this exercise the efficient allocation happens 
to increase surplus benefits in each sector (compare surplus 
values in Fig. BA with Fig. BB and in Fig. BC with Fig. 
BD) . T his improvement in each sector's net economic value 
occurs despite the reductions in total expenditures in each sec-
tor that result from how a larger stock size is expected to 
increase the productivity of anglers and commercial 
fishe rmen! 
Of course, the maximally efficient solution to an actual 
fish allocation problem will be influenced strongly by the 
position and shape of the respective seafood and angler de-
mand curves , as well as by the fish stock's population 
dynamics and the sensitivity of resource costs to stock size . 
where 1] is the Lagrangian multiplier. In thi s application, 1] is the net 
economic value of the marginal, o r " fi nal," fish allocated to both uses. 
The solutions to this system are qj - 6.375 , q, ~ 5.625, and 1] ~ $3.73. 
Finally , substitut ing the shares into their respective net benefit equa-
tions and adding the results yields $90 .12 million in net economic value 
($37.39 million in the seafood sector and $52 .73 million in the sport 
fishin g sector) . 
15This principle holds whenever the economic value of competing uses 
is compared , including conflicts between fi shing and waste disposal, oil 
production, habitat destruction, and aquaculture . 
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In fact, it is conceivable that based on economic efficiency 
alone, the elimination of either a commercial or sport 
fishery would be necessary to maximize net national 
benefits . This would occur, for example, when the marginal 
net economic value of one use was everywhere greater than 
for the other use within the bounds of total allowable catch. 
Summary and Conclusions _______ _ 
As stated in the Introduction, this guide was written both 
to expose specious economic-sounding arguments often 
heard when fish allocations are debated by commercial and 
recreational constituencies, and to provide fishery man-
agers, policy makers, and other interested parties with a 
foundation in benefit-cost analysis as it applies to the alloca-
tion of a fish stock among competitive uses. Accordingly, 
the Economic Value section defined economic value; the 
Benefit-Cost Analysis section presented the elements of 
benefit-cost analysis; the Input-Output Analysis section 
outlined the elements of input-output analysis in order to 
explain why this methodology cannot be used as a surrogate 
for benefit-cost analysis ; the Comparison of BCA and lOA 
section contrasted benefit-cost analysis and input-output 
analysis in greater detail; and the Efficient Allocation sec-
tion illustrated the properties of an efficient allocation of 
total allowable catch between the seafood producing and 
the recreational fishing sectors . 
Economic assessments of fishery allocations emphasize 
the following conclusions : 
• In benefit-cost analyses of fishery management, eco-
nomic value is the maximum amount that consumers 
are willing to pay for fish for food and for recreational 
fishing, and economic costs are the economic value of 
foregone production when resources such as labor, 
capital, and fish stocks are used to produce seafood or 
sport-caught fish instead of other goods or services which 
are valued by consumers and which would contribute 
to the nation's GNP. Neither expenditures nor revenues 
are notions of economic value . Net national benefits are, 
by definition , the difference between gross, or total, eco-
nomic value and resource costs. Put another way, net 
national benefits are the sum of consumer and producer 
surpluses for seafood consumers, anglers, and all in-
dustries that catch, land, distribute, process, or other-
wise make fish available to seafood consumers and 
anglers . 
• Input-output analysis was originally developed to 
describe a region's industrial network and interdepen-
dencies in terms of expenditures and revenues. Multi-
pliers are very useful indices of a region's self-sufficiency 
in input and output requirements and of the distribution 
of financial assets within a region. However, output 
multipliers and financial impacts have no relationship 
to benefit-cost analysis. Input-output analysis is not a 
surrogate for benefit-cost analysis. 
• A fishery regulation which increases net national benefits 
promotes the efficient use of publicly owned fish stocks 
and, thereby, improves the overall economic well-being 
of the nation, although , generally, net national benefits 
will actually be concentrated regionally. An economically 
efficient allocation cannot be determined, however, from 
historical catch or equal shares, consumer expenditures, 
industry revenues, output and other input-output multi-
pliers, or even a simple comparison of which sector leads 
to the higher total level of consumer and producer 
surpluses . Instead, net national benefits are enhanced 
when the combination of consumer and producer surpluses 
in both the seafood and sport fishing sectors are increased. 
Changes in economic surpluses in related input and retail 
markets (e.g., labor, gasoline, ice, fishing nets, tackle, 
meals, lodging) should be counted as negligible or zero 
unless there is significant unemployment of labor, 
capital , and/or natural resources. 
If this guide clarifies concepts and methods applicable 
to benefit-cost analyses of fishery allocation, then it also 
underscores considerable incompatibilities among social 
goals and the influence of vested interests. That is, an in-
efficient regulation may support more jobs or may some-
how appear "fair" if both the value-based and purely 
financial benefits and costs are shared more equally. In-
deed , the most efficient regulation of a fishery will not 
necessarily promote a "fair" distribution of, say, consumer 
surplus and industry profits. 
Clearly, given concerns about "fairness" and other 
social goals, conflicts surrounding fish allocations will be 
resolved politically whereas this guide focuses only on 
economic efficiency and the appropriate application of 
benefit-cost analysis. Nevertheless, deviations from the 
most efficient use of publicly owned fish stocks must be 
quantified and compared to net gains in employment and 
the distribution of financial assets which are expected from 
alternative management measures if informed decisions are 
to be made . This is the only way to gauge whether gains 
in areas other than efficiency actually justify losses in net 
national benefits . 
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Appendix A: Glossary and Index 
See Greenwald et al.'s (1983) dictionary of economics for additional concepts. Page numbers follow each definition. 
aggregate demand-the sum of each person's demand. (p. 5.) 
benefit-in benefit-cost analysis, " benefit" is synonymous with 
value, or the maximum willingness-to-pay for a good or ser-
vice, including environmental resources and services. It 
derives its monetary units from the willingness of consumers 
and producers to exchange income and revenue for goods, 
services, and inputs, but "benefits" could, in principle, be 
measured in terms of any constraint on choices, including 
leisure time. Total benefits include expenditures. See con-
sumer surplus, producer surplus, and net national benefits. 
(p. 6.) 
benefit-cost analysis-a methodology that compares economic 
value and the opportunity costs of using productive resources 
(i .e . , resource costs). A project or regulation is efficient if 
its total value exceeds its resource costs (i.e., if the change 
in net national benefits measured in terms of changes in con-
sumer surplus and producer surplus is positive). (p. 6.) 
common property-classically, a resource such as a fish stock 
in the Extended Economic Zone, but also resources such as 
groundwater and open space, which are publicly owned and 
can be used in a physical sense. Because of the absence of 
private property rights and because users cannot be excluded 
from the resource, common property is generally "over-
exploited" in the sense that one person's use affects the pro-
ductivity of others or the value that others de rive from the 
resource . (p. 1.) 
consumer surplus-the net economic value from consumption 
or use of a good or service. It is the difference between the 
maximum that a person is willing to pay for the good or ser-
vice rather than do without it and what he/she actually 
spends . The adjective, "consumer" is misleading because 
this category of value also applies to nonconsumptive uses 
(e.g., observing salmon runs) and to nonuse benefits (e.g., 
protecting marine mammals from exploitation). (p. 4.) 
contingent valuation method-a survey methodology in eco-
nomics that is often used to elicit the value of natural 
resources and environmental services which are not ade-
quately traded in markets. (p. 6.) 
cost-see expenditures, opportunity costs, and resource costs. 
(p . 6.) 
demand-in economics, the usually inverse relationship between 
quantity consumed (or otherwise used or even preserved) 
and a person ' s maximum willingness-to-pay for incremen-
tal increases in quantity. Market prices often (but not always) 
reveal the increments of willingness-to-pay. Other factors in-
fluencing willingness-to-pay include income, prices of sub-
stitutes, and, in recreational fishing, catch rate. Unlike plan-
ning where demand refers to the size of the quantity variable, 
economic demand is a behavioral relationship. (p. 4.) 
direct effects-in input-output analysis, the amount of inputs 
required to produce the output necessary to satisfy final 
demand. (p. 11.) 
economic impact analysis-see input-output analysis, the prin-
ciple method . (p. 10.) 
economics-in this primer, the study of how individuals and 
groups allocate scarce stocks such as income, time, and fish 
among competitive uses, and the responses to limi tations on 
their choices, including fishery regulations. (p. 1.) 
efficiency-in economics, an objective evaluation of the net na-
tional benefits of a public project or government regulation . 
Efficiency increases in proportion to increases in consumer 
surplus and producer surplus. (p. 8 .) 
expenditures-financial costs. Contrast with opportunity costs 
and resource costs. (p. 6 .) 
final demand expenditures-in input-output analysis, expen-
ditures by consumers, investment by industry , government 
expenditures, and exports from the regional economy. 
(p. 11.) 
final products-output sold to consumers . Contrast with inter-
mediate product. (p. 11.) 
financial analysis-cost accounting based on market prices as 
opposed to opportunity costs. Financial analysis is an im-
portant application of economic impact analysis. (p. 7.) 
income-payments received by labor and other primary inputs 
including owners of capital and natural resources. (p. 10.) 
ind irect effects- in input-output analysis, the amount of inputs 
required to satisfY derived demands by industrial sectors after 
the first round of direct effects (p. 12.) 
induced effects-in input-output analysis, the amount of inputs 
required to satisfy further increases in final demand which 
are induced by payments to primary inputs in response to 
direct and indirect effects . (p. 12.) 
inputs-both a productive resource, such as labor, capital, land, 
water, and fish, which is used to produce an output for use 
by other industries or by consumers (also called factor of pro-
duction) and intermediate products. In input-output analysis, 
inputs are expressed as expenditures . (p . 10.) 
input-output analysis-a systematic method that both describes 
the financial linkages and the network of input supplies and 
production which connect industries in a regional economy 
(however defined), and predicts changes in regional output, 
income, and employment. Input-output analysis generally 
focuses on economic activity and the self-sufficiency of an 
economy, unlike benefit-cost analysis which focuses on 
changes in net national benefits from use of productive 
resources . See benefit-cost analysis and multipliers. 
(p . 10.) 
intermediate product-a processed product from one industry 
which becomes an input in another industry. Contrast with 
primary input and final product. (p. 11.) 
Keynesian multiplier-see multiplier. 
marginal-a mathematical concept that in economics refers to 
very small , incremental changes in value and resource costs 
which add to or detract from the total amount. It gives rise 
to concepts such as marginal cost, marginal revenue, and 
marginal willingness-to-pay . (p. 20.) 
multiplier-as generally used in input-output analysis , the ratio 
of total impacts on output, income, or employment in a 
regional economy divided by the respective direct impact 
initially generated by investment or consumer expenditures. 
The size of a ratio multiplier is indicative of the self-suffi-
ciency of a regional economy's industrial complex, but ratio 
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multipliers should be interpreted with extreme caution when 
comparin g the potential impact of al ternative public invest-
ments and government regulations. Unlike ratio multipliers, 
Keynesian multiplier is the total impacts on ou tput, income, 
or employment per dollar of ini tial investment or consumer 
expenditures. T ype-I multiplier (either ratio or Keynesian) 
includes direct and indirect effects of investment and con-
sumer expenditures . Type-II multiplier also includes in-
duced effects. (p. 12 .) 
net economic value- the net result after subtracting resource 
costs from consumer surplus and producer surplus. (p. 7.) 
net national benefits-consumer surplus (total maximum will-
ingness-to-pay minus expenditures) plus producer surplus. 
See value and resource costs . (p. 7.) 
opportunity costs-generally intended to refer to foregone eco-
nomic value when a productive resource, such as labor, 
capi tal, land, or fi sh , is used to produce one good or service 
instead of something else. See resource costs . (p. 7.) 
ou tpu t- a good or service created by a production process. In 
input-output analysis, output is sales or revenue . Contrast 
with interm ediate product . (p. 10.) 
primary input-in input-output analysis, labor, capital, entre-
preneu rial skills, taxes, rent payments, and imports used to 
produce goods and services. See income and value-added, 
and contrast with intermediate product. (p. 11.) 
producer su rplus-total revenue minus all opportunity costs of 
production, including the opportunity costs of the entre-
preneurs ' skills, labor, capital, and ownership of natural 
resources. (p . 8.) 
profit-total revenue minus all financial costs for inputs, but not 
the opportunity costs attributable to entrepreneurs. Contrast 
with producer su rplus. (p. 5.) 
quantity-demanded-the amount of fish, fishing trips, or any 
other good or service purchased by a consumer at a given 
price or cost . In every day language, this is referred to as 
"demand ." (p. 5.) 
ra tio multipl ier-See multiplier. 
resources-the productive inputs, labor, capital, fish, land, and 
other natural resources. (p. 7 .) 
resource costs- the value of forgone production when produc-
tive resources are u sed to produce one good or service in-
stead of something else. This phrase is less ambiguous than 
opportun ity costs because the latter could actually be applied 
to financial costs. (p. 6.) 
revenues- gross financial benefit to producers. See profit. 
(p. 7.) 
sectors- a group of industries which share a common char-
acteristic . In input-output analysis, the industries in a 
sector have similar input requirements. In benefit-cost 
analysis, a sector tends to be a chain of vertically-integrated 
industries which increasingly transform a raw m aterial into 
a form sold to consumers (harvest -+ wholesale -+ retail). 
(p . 10.) 
supply-schedule of the quantities of goods and services that a 
business is willing to sell at various output prices. Other fac-
tors that affect supply include in put prices. (p . 7.) 
technical coefficients-in input-outpu t analysis , the average 
amount of a sector's input which is required to produce $1 
of output. (p . 11.) 
total effect-In input-output analysis, the amount of output , in-
come, or employment generated by a dollar of final expen-
ditures, including the influence of respending. T otal effects 
are also called Keynesian multipliers . See multipliers. 
(p. 12.) 
transactions flow table-in input-output analysis, a matrix which 
organizes input requirements of a regional economy and the 
distribution of output among industrial sectors and final de-
mand. (p. 11.) 
transfer payments-transfers or exchanges of money (e.g., taxes, 
unemployment compensation, subsidies). Transfer payments 
redistribute income but not the total value of production. 
Hence, net national benefits are not affected by transfer 
payments. (p. 7.) 
travel cost method-a methodology which uses travel-related 
costs to measure willingness-to-pay for natural resources and 
services, such as fishing trips and catch rates, and to estimate 
demand models. (p. 6.) 
type I multiplier-see multiplier. 
type II multiplier-see multiplier . 
value-see maximum willingness-to-pay. Net value from con-
sumption is consumer surplus and net value from produc-
tion is producer surplus. In economics, value should be 
distinguished from financial benefits. It is misleading, 
therefore, that in benefit-cost analysis a "benefit " is a gain 
in consumer and producer surpluses and a "cost" is a loss 
in economic value (i.e., a resource, or opportunity cost). 
(p . 3.) 
value-added-the difference between the price of a business's 
output and the opportunity costs of intermediate products 
used to produce the outpu t. In input-output analys is, it is 
the increased value contributed by primary inputs, excluding 
imports. (p. 11.) 
willingness-to-pay-in economics, what consumers are willing 
and able to pay for goods and services (including environ-
mental goods and services) or what producers are willing and 
able to pay for inputs. (p . 4 .) 
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Appendix B: Elements of Input-Output Analysis -------------------
This appendix presents technical aspects of input-output 
modeling. It begins with the transactions flow table pre-
sented in Section IV that is based loosely on Hushak's 
(1987) study of Ohio's Lake Erie commercial and recrea-
tional fisheries. See Archer (1977), Isard (1975), Miernyk 
(1966), Miller and Blair (1985), Propst and Gavrilis (1987), 
and Richardson (1972) for more details on modeling 
procedures. 
Nearly all information required for standard input-
output analysis is contained in a transactions flow table 
such as Table 4. The analysis is facilitated if we recognize 
that much of this table can be expressed in matrix form 
as a system of equations. Accordingly, the output of a pro-
ducing sector is 
m n 
LX I} + 2 F · I X i , (1) 
j~l i=m+ 1 
intermediate final total 
demand demand output 
where " i" and ".i" designate rows and columns, respec-
tively. For example, the row for recreational fishing can 
be written 
o + 2 + 1 + 4 + 3 = 10 . (2) 
Similarly, inputs required by a purchasing sector are 
m 
LX. I} + V } + L ) X i ' (3) 
i - J 
intermediate value-added import total 
demand demand demand inputs 
For example, the input requirements for the recreational 
fishing sector can be expressed as 
o + 2 + 2 + 3 + 3 = 10. (4) 
otice that routine input-output analysis requires a sec-
tor's inputs and outputs to be equal (i.e ., X i = ~.). 
Accordingly, 
m m 
2 X I 2 ..tj , and (5) 
i~ J j~ l 
2 F I 2 (lj + ~). (6) 
i=m+ I j~m + J 
Also , regional income must equal final demand expen-
ditures, adjusted for imports . 
Together, Equations (1 - 6) are used to "reconcile," or 
balance the transactions flow table for a regional economy. 
Data plugged into the table can be. primary data collected 
from regional surveys, or they can be secondary data 
generated from technical coefficients from another input-
output model and from average output, input, and income 
relationships reported by the Bureau of the Census (e. g., 
Hushak et al. 1984). Often, regional economists use the 
"semi-survey" approach which combines surveys of sec-
tors that are important to the analysis (e.g., commercial 
fishing and charter boat fishing) with secondary data. 
What follows from here depends upon which primary 
input sectors and final demand sectors are included in the 
analysis. W e begin with an analysis of type-I effects for 
which only sectors producing intermediate products are en-
dogenous. Notice that Equations (1 and 2) for a single pro-
ducing sector can be rearranged such that 
Table 4 
Commercial fishing 
R ecreational fishing 
All other industries 
Value-added 
Imports 
Total inputs 
Commercial 
fishing 
o 
o 
2 
7 
10 
Transactions flow table ($ millions). 
Purchasing sectors 
(i.e . , intermediate demand) 
R ecreational 
fishing 
All other 
industries 
Producing sectors 
0 7 
2 1 
2 43000 
Primary inputs 
3 49992 
3 7000 
10 100000 
Final demand 
expenditures 
Households 
0 
4 
38000 
0 
10000 
48004 
Exports 
3 
3 
18996 
- 17004 
1998 
Output 
10 
10 
100000 
100020 
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(7) 
Furthermore, if the amount of sector i ' s output purchased 
by each of the purchasing sectors is a linear funct ion of 
the latter 's output, we can express Equation 7 as 
where the a,j are the technical input coefficients, 
(9) 
or the direct input requirements per dollar of output . 
Equation (8) can be further generalized and used to 
deri ve interdependence coefficients. The system of three equa-
tions with form (8) can be written in matrix form , 
x - AX = (1 - A )X = F, (10) 
where, in this exercise, A is a (3 x 3) matrix of technical 
coefficients and 1 is a (3 x 3) identity matrix with " 1" s 
along the diagonal and " O" s elsewhere. In our example, 
A f
o.o 
0.0 
L 0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
0 .2 
Finally, it follows that 
0 .00007l 
0 .00001 . 
0.43000J 
X = (1 - A) - I F = BF, 
( 11 ) 
( 12) 
where B is a matrix of interdependence coefficients. In our 
example , the B matrix of direct and indirect effects is, 
[ 
1.00002 0.00003 
B = 0.00000 1.25000 
0.35089 0.43862 
0. 00012] 
0 .00002 , 
1. 75444 
( 13) 
where hij is the total inputs required from sector i per 
dollar of final demand for sector j's output. For example, 
a $1 million increase in final demand for the recreational 
sector' s output requires approximately $0.44 million in in-
puts (j = 2) from industries in the "other" sector (i = 3). 
Recall from the Input-Output Analysis section that these 
type-I impacts are the sum of direct and indirect effects. 
Output multipliers associated with a change in final de-
mand for each sector's output are simply the sums of the 
respective sectors' interdependence coefficients. Thus, the 
output multipliers for the commercial fishing, recreational 
fishing, and "other" sectors are 1. 3 509 1, 1. 68865 , and 
1. 75458 , respectively. A sector ' s output multiplier ex-
presses the total input requirements from all sectors re-
quired to produce $1 of its output. 
Total impacts and ratio multipliers for income and 
employment are derived from their direct requirements and 
Equation (12). In our example, the direct requirements for 
value-added inputs (i .e., income to labor, capital, and land) 
are 
C = lr _L } -~9,9Y~J'" = [0.7 0.3 0 .49992]. (1 4) 
10 10 100,000 -
Also, we are using the following direct employment re-
quirements: 
D = [0.00003 0. 00002 0.00001 J. (1 5) 
For example, a dollar of output from the commercial fish-
ing sector requires 0 .00003 employees (i .e., each $100,000 
of output requires three employees). In turn, the total in-
come effects for each sector are 
Total income effects = CB (16) 
where CB = [0.87543 0.59429 0.87717]. For example, 
$1 million of final demand for commercial fisheries 
generates about $0 .88 million in income for primary in-
puts. Similarly, the total employment effects for each sec-
tor are 
T otal employment effects = DB, (17) 
where DB = [ 0.0000335 0.0000294 0.0000175]. For 
example, in this exercise, $1 million of final demand for 
recreational fisheries generates about 29 jobs. Finally, the 
ra tio multipliers fo r income and employment effects are 
simply total effects divided by di rect effects . See Table 2 
in the Input-Output Analysis section for a summary of the 
various type-I impacts and multipliers . 
Recall that type-II effects include induced effects . This 
expansion of input-output analysis requires the technical 
coefficients matrix to be augmented by one row for value-
added inputs and by one column for tinal household 
demand : 
A 
0.0 0. 0 0 .00007 
0.0 0 .2 0 .00001 
0. 2 0.2 0. 43000 
0 .7 0 .3 0 .49992 
0.0000001 
0 .000083 
0 .791600 . 
0 .000000 
(18) 
Notice that the fourth column corresponds to household 
expenditures and is calculated by dividing entries in the 
transactions flow table by total household expenditures 
(i .e., by $48,004). 
Calculation of total type-II effects and ratio multipliers 
is analogous to the type-I calculations with the addition 
of a fourth column for d irect income and employment ef-
fects in matrices C and D, respectively . In our example, 
these columns have zero entries. Type-II results are also 
reported in Table 2 in the Input-Output Analysis section. 
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Appendix C: General Equilibrium Demand in an Exvessel Market __________ _ 
Just et al. (1982) present theory and practical advice for 
estimating multimarket changes in net economic value 
behind a single derived demand curve when a resource 
market supplies a necessary input to related markets . I 
Their contribution is important in the context of fishery 
management because the data required to estimate separate 
welfare changes in exvessel, wholesale, and retail markets 
for fish generally are not available. This appendix (which 
augments the discussions in the Benefit-Cost Analysis sec-
tion, the Comparison of BCA and lOA section, and the 
Efficient Allocation sections of net benefit estimation in 
seafood markets) is adapted from Chapter Nine in Just et 
al. (1982) . Rigorous, mathematical proofs supporting the 
heuristic presentation here can be found in their Appen-
dix D, "Welfare Measures for Multimarket Equilibrium." 
For empirical applications to commercial fisheries see Ed-
wards (1981) and Ready and Bishop (1988) . 
This presentation derives from the demand and supply 
relationships depicted in Figure 10. Figure lOA contains 
the wholesale industry's input demand curves in an exvessel 
market for marine fish: De(PwO, d) and De(Pwl,d) . Al-
though not shown explicitly, resource supply is assumed 
to be perfectly inelastic. For now, ignore D*(d, 8,Pr). In 
Figure lOB, Sw(PeO,d) and Sw(Pel,d) are wholesale supply 
curves and Dr(P" 8) is the derived demand of retailers . 
(For simplicity, the various possible wholesale markets-
'Just et al. ( 1982) define a necessary input (also called essential input) 
as one for which a firm will exit the industry if the input is either not 
available or priced above the firm's willingness-to-pay . 
distributors and processors-are aggregated .) In Figure 
laC, we assume for the moment that consumer demand 
in the retail market is perfectly elastic and, therefore, 
represented by Pr. Sr(PwO,8) and Sr(Pwl, 8) are retail sup-
ply curves. The other prices, Pe and Pw, are exvessel and 
wholesale prices, q" qw, and qr are exvessel, wholesale, 
and retail quantities, and d and 8 are exogenous deter-
minants of wholesale and retail supply, respectively. The 
superscripts, ° and I, denote initial and final prices and 
quantities, respectively. 
The starting point for our comparison of welfare 
"triangles" in the three markets depicted in Figure 10 is 
the understanding that producer surplus measured behind 
a retail supply curve is completely captured behind the de-
mand curve for an essential input. 2 Accordingly, area 
x + y behind wholesale supply curve, Sw(PeO, d) is equal to 
area a + c behind exvessel demand, De(PwO,d). Similarly, 
area x + u behind Sw(Ptl , d) is equal to area a + b behind 
D,(Pwl , d). 
Next consider a fishery regulation which effectively in-
creases the stock of fish available to anglers but reduces 
commercial catch from qeD to qel and increases exvessel 
price from Pea to Pel-possibly a ban on a commercial 
fishing in state waters . T his regulation sets off a series of 
adjustments in the seafood sector, beginning with a shift 
in the wholesale supply curve from Sw(PeO , d) to Sw(Pel, d) . 
Consequently, wholesale price increases from Pwo to Pwl , 
' This statement derives from duality theory and the envelope theorem. 
(See, for example, Just et al. [1982].) 
A 
P w .------------, 
B 
-
D*(M.P,) P'w I-____ ~ 
b) 
p'.I----;:".,,: ...... 
L-____ ~--~~q. 
q. qQ. 
L....-___ +-_-+-....Jn 
q'w ..... 
L-_____ ..,....._-+.......Jq, 
q'. qO, 
Landings Market Whol ..... Marttet Retail Market 
Figure 10 
Net national benefits (i.e., net economic value) behind a vertically integrated exvessel demand curve. 
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causing derived demand in the exvessel market to in-
crease to De(Pr!) . Notice that D*(d ,e,Pr) (which is 
described later as sectoral demand) connects the initial and 
final equilibrium positions in the exvessel market. (Notice 
also that retail price remains constant by assumption, and, 
therefore, derived demand in the wholesale market does 
not shift .) 
What are the complete welfare implications of this 
regulation and how can the change in net total economic 
value be measured? As begun above with reference to 
duality theory, the change in the wholesale industry's 
surplus can be measured in either the wholesale or ex-vessel 
markets. In the wholesale market the change is area x + y 
minus area x + u, or areay - u. Equivalently, the change 
measured in the ex-vessel market is area a + c minus area 
a + b, or area c - b. Hence, areay - u is equal to area c - b. 
This assessment is incomplete, however, until we include 
the welfare changes for retailers and commercial fishermen 
(and, later, consumers) imposed by reduced landings. In 
Figure lOB , the change in the retail industry's surplus is 
area u + v (or area z in Fig. 1 OC). As a result, the total 
change in producer surplus in the wholesale market is area 
u + v plus area y - u, or area v + y. Finally, although the 
information is not shown on Figure lOA, the change in the 
commercial fishing industry's producer surplus can be 
calculated as the change in total revenue due to reduced 
catch minus the change in total costs due to increased travel 
distance. Unfortunately, information required to estimate 
a system of demand and supply curves (e.g., retail prices) 
generally is lacking. T hus, from an applied perspective we 
have not yet answered how to measure the total change 
in net economic value caused by the fishery regulation. The 
answer lies behind curve D *( d, e, Pr) in the exvessel mar-
ket in a manner of speaking. That is, the derived demand 
curve for a hypothetical in tegration of wholesalers and 
retailers is D *(d, fJ ,Pr) where wholesale price, Pw, adjusts 
endogenously. This follows under competitive market con-
ditions because profit maximization by the hypothetical in-
tegrated industry is equivalent to profit maximization by 
the individual industries. T hus, D *(d, fJ,Pr) takes account 
of equilibrium adjustments in prices and ou tput in related 
markets. (Again, the reader is referred to Appendix D in 
Just et al. [1982] for a rigorous proof.) Accordingly, area 
c + d is equal to area y + v in the wholesale m arket (i.e., 
the net change in the wholesale and retail industries' pro-
ducer surplus). 3 
Approaching these results from another direction will 
shed some light on the theory. Let the wholesale industry's 
" ordinary" exvessel demand curve be 
3The change in the retail industry' s surplus also can be isolated from these 
results. In particular, since the total chan ge in producer surplus (ex-
cluding, for the moment , effects on the fishing industry) is c + d = Y + v 
and the change in wholesalers' surplus is c - b = Y - u, the change in 
the retail industry 's surplus is d + b by subtraction. 
(19) 
Also, let the price linkage between markets be 
Finally, substitution oflinkage (20) into demand model (19) 
yields what Just et al. (1982) label the "equilibrium " 
demand curve, 
At least two properties of equilibrium demand curve (21 ) 
are important. As illustrated in F igure lOA, the inverted 
equilibrium demand model has a steeper slope than the 
market demand model. In addition, wholesale pr ice, 
Pw, varies endogenously in an equilibrium exvessel de-
mand model unlike in an market demand model where the 
wholesale price variable (or an instrumental variable from , 
say, the first stage of two stage least squares) is specified. 
This feature allows researchers to estimate changes in net 
benefits in wholesale and retail markets behind an ap-
propriately specified ex-vessel demand model such as model 
(21). Note, however, that dropping related market prices 
such as Pw from the exvessel demand curve due to severe 
multicollinearity does not acciden tally result in a general 
equilibrium demand model unless it is accompanied by 
specification of the exogenous determinants of wholesale 
and retail supply. 4 
We can now introduce the effects of a downward slop-
ing consumer demand model. Although not demonstrated 
graphically, the equilibrium exvessel demand model be-
comes D*(d, fJ,E) where E is a vector of exogenous variables 
affecting consumer demand (e .g. , income). In principle, 
then, changes in the area behind an equilibrium derived 
demand curve at the exvessel level can be used to measure 
changes in consumer surplus as well as changes in producer 
surplus in wholesale and retail markets given data on ex-
vessel price and the exogenous determinants of wholesale 
supply, retail supply, and consumer dem and. Model (21) 
now becomes 
where E substitutes for PT' Accordingly, the total change 
in ne't national benefits (i.e ., net economic value) due to 
a fishery regulation is 
'Similarly , simultaneous equations estimators do not produce general 
equilibrium demand (or supply) models because the original structural 
identities of the ordinary market models remain unchanged . 
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N 
ANNB I1Ro + L I1Ri + I1CSN , (23) 
i - I 
where I1Ro is the change in the fishing industry 's producer 
surplus, I1So is the total change in producer surplus and 
consumer surplus in wholesale and retail markets, and N 
is the retail market. I1So is comprised of I1Ri , the change 
in producer surplus for each wholesale and retail industry, 
and of I1CSN , the change in consumer surplus. 
Although we concentrated on a competitive vertical 
market structure, Just et al. (1982) extend their theory to 
market distortions, a horizontal market structure, and, 
naturally, a combination of both structures. Indeed, 
whether a researcher captures general equilibrium changes 
in welfare depends on whether the theoretical model's 
assumptions concerning necessary-inputs and pure com-
petition are reasonably satisfied, and on whether the 
appropriate set of related markets are included in the 
"mini-economy." Determinants of a "mini-economy" 
include prices in excluded markets (perhaps a price 
index), policy instruments such as taxes, and relevant 
natural, social, and political variables which shift ordinary 
demand and supply. Of course, applied economists must 
balance theoretical requirements of the method against 
the availability of data and decide whether an adequate 
assessment is possible . In specific applications, researchers 
should carefully consider whether horizontally-related 
markets for other inputs such as labor and for consumer 
substitutes should be internalized. 
The multi-market framework which allows one to mea-
sure welfare changes completely in a single market seems 
ideally suited for fishery problems given the competition 
assumptions and the necessary-input requirement. Typ-
ically, fish, shellfish, and crustaceans are processed through 
vertically structured markets . Also, to a large extent, the 
industry is competitively structured because of the large 
number of firms in each market and because of the 
availability of market information. Furthermore, given the 
fishing sector's small size in relation to the national 
economy, price and quantity changes probably have small 
(if not negligible) effects on the rest of the economy. Also, 
the supply of other inputs to the fish processing sector may 
be nearly perfectly inelastic, although this would not be 
the case for labor in isolated communities. Furthermore, 
the multi-market framework may be the most tractable 
alternative for measuring combined changes in producer 
surplus and consumer surplus in the wholesale and retail 
sectors. Inadequate data and severe multicollinearity 
among exvessel, wholesale, and retail prices probably 
preclude measuring welfare changes behind ordinary de-
mand and supply curves; therefore, the distribution of 
welfare changes could not be measured . The multimarket 
framework also offers an attractive alternative to the dif-
ficult expansion of input-output analysis for the measure-
ment of changes in producer surplus (see Hushak 1987) 
whenever prices in other input markets change in response 
to a fishery regulation. 

